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NOTES AND COMMENTS

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Air Law-Application of Federal Rules to Intrastate
Flight-Injuries from Low Flying
Defendantes dirigible flew over plaintiff's farm at an altitude of
150 to 200 feet, frightening plaintiff's horses, and causing injury to
plaintiff. One of plaintiff's allegations of negligence was violation
of federal air traffic rules, 1 under which the minimum altitude for
flight is 500 feet.2 The petition failed to state whether this was an
interstate or an intrastate flight. Defendant's demurrer was overruled, the court saying plaintiff had stated a case under federal law
which would not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If the flight
was intrastate, plaintiff's recovery would depend upon his proof that
violation of the altitude rule would affect interstate commerce. 8
The Air Commerce Act declares: "It shall be unlawful . . . to
navigate any aircraft otherwise than in conformity with the air
traffic rules," 4 and the managers of the bill in congress said ". . the
air traffic rules are to apply whether the aircraft is engaged in . . .
interstate or intrastate navigation." 5 The court refuses to follow
these expressions and apply the federal rules to all intrastate flights,
but demands that some connection or interference with interstate
commerce be shown. Since flying is not sufficient per se, it is difficult to see how a violation of the altitude rule can possibly meet this
demand, and the court, expressly recognizing the difficulty, was most
liberal in overruling the demurrer.
It is possible only to surmise what connection with interstate
commerce the courts will require before allowing the application of
federal rules to instrastate flight. In the analogous field of railroad
transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission has been allowed to exercise authority over intrastate rates and service if interstate commerce was even remotely affected, 6 the famous Shreveport
'Chapter V of Air Commerce Regulations issued by Secretary of Commerce
in accordance with Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 570, 49 U. S. C. A.
(1929, Supp.) §173 (e).
'Air Commerce Regulations, c. V, §81 (G).

'Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D. Ohio,

1929).

'44 Stat. 574, 49 U. S. C. A. §181 (A) (5).

'Congressional Rec., May 13, 1926, p. 9390.
'Notes (1921) 14 A. L. R. 454; (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1100 and cases cited.
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Rate Case 7 being the landmark in this field. These decisions involving railroad transportation and the liberal attitude taken in the principal case indicate that the courts will not be exacting in their requirements. 8 There seems to be good cause for Mr. W. R. McCracken's assertion 9 that ". . .the regulation of aerial navigation
will ultimately be either largely or exclusively vested in the federal
government. ..."10
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, as adopted by twenty
states, including North Carolina, 1 does not fix a definite minimum
altitude for flight, but makes it unlawful to fly so low that existing
use of the land will be interfered with. In a state court, under
this statute, the present plaintiff could probably recover.

H. L. LOBDELL.
Bailments-Proof of Loss and Presumption of NegligenceStipulations Against Negligence
The United States Lines issued specifications and requested bids
for the repair of the steamship America. The bids received were too
high. The specifications were changed and the defendant shipyard
received the contract on the second bidding. Und'er the first set of
specifications the contractor was required to carry insurance on the
ship for $2,000,000, owner's benefit, and premium $5,000. By the
contract agreed upon, under the second set of specifications, it was
provided, ". . . The United States Lines will continue the present
hull, machinery, and equipment insurance upon the vessel during the
period the vessel is at the contractor's yard. . . ." While in the
possession of the defendant, the ship was damaged seriously by fire.
"234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1913). This case was charac-

terized by Senator Glass of Virginia as the case "which practically extirpated
every remaining right any state had over intrastate commerce." Associated
Press dispatch of Feb. 10, 1930.
8 Nor have th6 courts been exacting in determining what constitutes interstate commerce itself. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999 (1871)
(holding that a steamboat plying between two points in same state, but carrying
goods destined for points outside the state, was engaged in interstate commerce).
Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 250 U. S. 101, 39 Sup. Ct. 396, 63 L. ed.
869 (1919) (holding that a cook for a crew repairing a railroad bridge was
engaged in interstate commerce).
'McCracken, Air Law (1923) 57 Am. L. Ray. 97.
" Dean Bogert of Cornell looks askance upon this possibility, and declares
the principle of allowing federal interference with intrastate commerce "isone
which should be sparingly applied." Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1921)
6 CORN. L. Q. 271.
" p. L. 1929, c. 190, §4; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1929 Supp.) §191 (M).
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In admiralty, the District Court found the defendant negligent in
handling the ship, and held that the contract did not relieve the defendant of liability for loss caused by the defendant's negligence.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the
contract exempted the defendant of liability for loss caused by defendant's negligence up to the agreed amount of $2,000,000.1
This case raises the following questions:
(1) Does evidence of loss or damage to goods while in possession of the bailee justify, or if unrebutted require, a finding of negligence? In the absence of special contract, a bailment for mutual
benefit requires the bailee to use diligence commensurate with the
degree of skill he professes to the public to possess. 2 If the bailor
proves a bailment, and the failure of the bailee to return the bailed
property, the bailee offering no evidence, the bailor makes out a
prima facie case. 8 This position, under the North Carolina rule,
would permit him to go to the jury ;4 under the Federal rule, would
entitle him to recover. 5 Does the bailee, by offering evidence that
the property was lost or damaged through causes consistent with due
care on his part, rebut the presumption raised by the bailor in the
above situation? The older and more prevalent rule holds that he
does, and the duty of going forward with the evidence shifts to the
bailor to prove the negligence of the bailee. 6 The Federal courts, as
in the principal case, North Carolina, and the minority of state courts,
hold that the bailor's presumption is not rebutted unless the bailee
7
assumes the duty of going forward with the proof of due care.
(2) May the bailee stipulate against liability for loss caused by
his own negligence? There is no unanimity of opinion among the
courts in answer to this question. Some courts have held definitely
'Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 34 F. (2d)
100 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
"GODDARD, OUTLINE OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (Cullen's ed. 1928) 119.
'Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915).
'McINTOsH, N. C. P. & P. IN CiV. CASES (1929) 609; White v. Hines, 182
N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921).
'Int. M. M. S. S. Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 296 Fed. 855, 860 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924).
Note (1923) 23 Co. L. REV. 398; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pac.
Trans. Co., 120 Wash. 665, 208 Pac. 55 (1922).
'McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5
N. C. L. REv. 291; Note (1925) 3 TEx. L. REv. 290; Fleishman v. So. Ry. Co.,

76 S. C. 237, 56 S. E. 974 (1906) ; Nutt v. Davison, 54 Colo. 586, 588, 131 Pac.

390 (1913); Smith v. Economical Garage, 176 N. Y. Supp. 479, 107 N. Y.

Misc. 430 (1919); Beck v. Wilkins-Ricks Co., 179 N. C. 231, 102 S. E. 313
(1920).
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that a bailee may not contract against liability for loss caused by his
own negligence. 8 Others have adopted the view that the bailee may
contract against liability for his own negligence, provided the bailee
acts in good faith, and, unless it amounts to "gross" negligence, by
which they seem to mean misconduct approaching bad faith.9 The
Federal courts permit the private bailee to limit his liability for
negligence, but do not extend this privilege to public bailees, as it is
considered that such an extension would be contrary to public
policy.' 0
(3) The ability of the bailee in the principal case to contract
against liability for his own negligence was admitted by both opinions. The main point in controversy was, "Did the bailee, by express
contract, excuse himself from such liability?" Article X, section 2,
of the contract, after stating conditions demanding the highest degree of care, contained the clause, "Provided, however, that the
United States Lines will continue the present hull, machinery, and
equipment insurance during the period the vessel is at the contractor's
yard. . . ." The majority opinion construes the above provision to
relieve the bailee of liability for his own negligence, and to give the
bailee the benefit of the bailor's insurance. A private bailment for
mutual benefit does not make the bailee liable as an insurer. The
bailee, by express contract, may limit or increase his liability, but
such a variation must be clearly expressed as the intention of both
parties." The evidence showed that an express contract making the
bailee insurer was customary in similar bailments. In view of the reduced bid under the second specifications, this provision was not included, except as to material removed from the ship and placed in
storage by the bailee. 12 It appears that this reveals an intention by
'Lancaster

County Natl. Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. St. 47 (1869); Pilson v.

Tip Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913).
'Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (1902);
Grady v. Schweinler, 16 N. D. 452, 15 Ann. Cas. 161 (1907); Hanes v.
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 29.
" 0McCormick v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1903) ; Int. M. M. S. S.
Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., supra note 5; The Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1909). In Santa Fe, Prescott, and Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros.
Const. Co., 228 U. S. 177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474, 57 L. ed. 787 (1913), a common
carrier acting in a private capacity was permitted to stipulate against liability
for its own negligence.
BAILM NTS (1896) 28; McCormick v. Shippy, supra note 10, at
'HALE,
51; Int. M. M. S. S. Co. v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., supra note 5, at 860; Marks
v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (1902).
Newport News Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, supra note
1, at 102.
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the bailor' to assume risks of loss that might occur by means other

than the negligence of the bailee. The bailee is placed by the contract in the identical position as regards loss or damage due to his
negligence that he would occupy in the absence of an express contract. The tenor of Article X, as a whole, does not excuse the bailee
of any liability for negligence. Consequently, the dissenting opinion
seems to reflect the sounder view.
J. A. WILLIAMS.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Fixing Liability of
Stockholders in Insolvent State Banks
The procedure by which the statutory liability of stockholders in
insolvent banking corporations could best be enforced has been a
problem in North Carolina. Prior to 1927 no assessment could be
made against such stockholders until the value of the banks' assets
in proportion to its debts had been ascertained.' This requirement
often resulted in long and expensive litigation, and made it difficult
in many cases for the receiver to enforce liability. To remedy this
situation the legislature enacted section 13, .chapter 113, Public Laws
of 1927.2
This statute first came before the North Carolina Court in Corporation Commission v. Murphey.3 The defendant in the case was a
stockholder inwan insolvent bank, and had failed to pay the "levy"
docketed in clerk's office of the Superior Court by the Corporation
'Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 193 N. C. 113,
136 S. E. 362 (1927) ; Corporation Commission v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
192 N. C. 366, 135 S. E. 48 (1926) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §239.
'"After the expiration of thirty days from the date of the filing of the
notice of the taking of possession of any bank, in the office of the clerk of the
Superior Court, the Corporation Commission may levy an assessment equal
to the stock liability of each stockholder in the bank, and shall file a copy of
such levy in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, which shall be recorded and indexed as judgments, and shall have the force and effect of a
judgment of the Superior Courts of this state; and the same shall become due
and payable immediately, and if not paid execution may at the instance of the
Corporation Commission issue against the stockholder delinquent, and actions
on said assessments may be instituted against any non-resident stockholders
in the same manner as other actions against non-residents of the state. Any
stockholder may appeal to the Superior Court from the levy of assessment;
the issue raised by the appeal may be determined as other actions in the
Superior Court. At any time before the determination of said appeal such stockholder may petition the resident or presiding judge to relieve his property of
the lien, pending the determination of the question raised by said appeal; and
such relief may be granted in the discretion of the judge hearing the petition
and upon such terms as he may fix." N. C. Code (Michie 1927) §218c (13).
' 197 N. C. 42, 147 S. E. 667 (1929) ; affirmed 50 Sup. Ct. 161 (1930).
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Commission in accordance with the statute. The defendant later
entered special appearance in a proceeding by the Corporation Commission for the liquidation of the bank and moved for a judgment
declaring the "levy" void and enjoining enforcement thereof, on the
grounds that the statute was contrary to the due process clauses of
the state 4 and federal constitutions. 5 The statute was held constitutional, the court construing the act of the Corporation Commission
in filing the stockholder's name and the amount due on his stock with
the clerk of the Superior Court to be an assessment, and that the
right to trial de nova on appeal from the assessment to the Superior
Court constituted due process of law.
The essential elements of due process of law in questions of procedure are notice and opportunity to be heard,0 before a tribunal having jurisdiction,7 at any time prior to rendition of final judgment. 8
If these elements are present the proceedings will be declared constitutional. The due process clause does not guarantee any particular
form of procedure in state tribunals, being concerned with the substance and not the form of such procedureO
The statute in question 0 specifically provides that the Corporation Commission "shall file a copy of such levy in the office of the
clerk of the Superior Court, which * * * shall have the force and
*North Carolina Constitution, Art. 1, §17.
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment.
'Drainage Commissioners v. Mitchell, 170 N. C. 324, 87 S: E. 112 (1915);
State v. Collins, 169 N. C. 323, 84 S. E. 1049 (1915) ; City of Kinston v. Loftin,
149 N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1069 (1908) ; Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co., 133 N. C.
478, 45 S. E. 768, 98 Am. St. Rep. 718 (1903); Rusk v. Thompson, 170 Mo.
App. 76, 156 S. W. 64 (1913); Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 16 N. E.
826, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637 (1888); Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Ain. Rep.
289 (1878) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 332, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. ed.
254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921) ; Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 16
Sup. Ct. 344, 40 L. ed. 467 (1896); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24
L. ed. 616 (1877). "A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state,
unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to
give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard," American Law Institute, Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1926) §80.
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877) ; Charles v. City of
Marion, 98 Fed. 166 (C. C. D. Ind. 1899) ; Garvin v. Daussman, supra note 6.
'Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C. 199, 203, 59 S. E. 653
(1907): Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 415. 22 Sup. Ct. 384, 46 L. ed.
612 (1902) ; Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 307, 22 Sup. Ct. 162, 46 L. ed.
207 (1902).
Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co., supra note 6; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz T.
North, 271 U. S. 40, 46 Sup. Ct. 384, 70 L. ed. 818 (1926) ; Simon v. Craft,
182 U. S. 427, 21 Sup. Ct. 836, 45 L. ed. 1165 (1901).
" Supra note 2.
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effect of a judgment of the Superior Courts * * * and if not paid,
execution may at the instance of the Corporation Commission issue
against the stockholder." An execution is a judicial writ issuing
from the court where the judgment is rendered."1 Every execution
presupposes a judgment of some sort, and the right given to issue the
one implies the existence of the other.' 2 Therefore the "levy" provided for in the statute is a judgment issuing from the Corporation
Commission, a quasi-judicial body. 13 It is not a mere assessment.
The language of the legislature in the statute says that the "levy"
shall be recorded as a judgment, and "shall have the force and effect
of a judgment of the Superior Courts." The judgment is final 14 to
the extent that if the defendant does not appeal he is subject to execution' r against his property.
A total want of jurisdiction over the person or thing to be affected
by a judgment renders the judgment void, and the proceedings in
which it was obtained are obnoxious to the constitutional guaranty
of due process of law. 16 When a proceeding is strictly in personam,
brought to determine the personal obligations of the parties, personal
service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the cause is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction.' 7 Where a defendant has
never been served with process, nor appeared voluntarily, a judgment
against him is not simply voidable, but void, and may be so treated
whenever and wherever offered, without any direct proceeding to
'Gooch v. Gregory, 65 N. C. 142 (1871).
"Sheppard v. Bland, 87 N. C. 163, 167 (1882).
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1023.
""A judgment is final which decides the case upon its merits, without any
reservation for other and future directions of the court, so that it is not necessary to bring the case again before the court," Sanders v. May, 173 N. C.
47, 91 S. E. 526 (1917) ; Bunker v. Bunker, 140 N. C. 18, 52 S. E. 237 (1905).
""An execution is the writ which directs and authorizes an officer to carry
into effect the final judgment or decree of a court," Raulerson v. Peeples, 81
Fla. 206, 87 So. 629 (1920).
"The writs of attachment and execution are
essentially different, the former is issued for the purpose of seizing property
and holding same in order that, if a judgment should be obtained, the property
thus seized will be forthcoming to satisfy said judgment, while the latter is a
writ issued for the purpose of enforcing a judgment that has been obtained,"
Mount v. Trammel, 73 Okl. 96, 175 Pac. 232 (1918).
" Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
' T Johnson v. Whilden, 166 N. C. 104, 81 S. E. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 783
(1914), affirmed 171 N. C. 153, 88 S. E. 223, 225 (1916); Vick v. Flournoy,
147 N. C. 209, 60 S. E. 978 (1908); Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 24
S. E. 527, 36 L. R. A. 402 (1896) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed.

565 (1877).
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vacate it.18 The only notice given the defendant under the statute
in question, before judgment was entered, was the filing of notice
with the clerk of the Superior Court that the Corporation Commission had taken over the insolvent bank. 19 This was not a personal
service, nor was there a voluntary appearance by the defendant or
20
his attorney.
If the interpretation placed upon the statute by the court, that the
levy was an assessment only, was correct, then the decision of the
court upon the constitutionality of the statute was also correct. 21
An assessment is usually considered in the nature of a tax, to be enforced against the specific property assessed, and not enforced against
the property owner personally. 22 When a stockholder in a corporation is assessed on his stock and fails to pay, the proceeding is to
sell the stock for the debt, and if the income from the sale does not
cover the assessment, the balance is recovered by instituting a personal action against the stockholder. 23 The assessment as construed
under the statute in question was not against property, but against
the defendant personally, and was to be collected from his property
generally by execution. There would seem to be some question as to
"Johnson v. Whilden, supra note 17; Condry v. Cheshire, 88 N. C. 375
(1883) ; Doyle v. Brown, 72 N. C. 393 (1875) ; Stalling v. Gully, 48 N. C. 344
(1856).
" See Statute, supra note 2.
'The question arises as to the operation of the statute on non-resident
stockholders. The art provides "and actions on said assessments may be instituted against any non-resident stockholders in the same manner as other
actions against non-residents of the state." A personal judgment against a
non-resident rendered without personal jurisdiction over him is void. FREEMAN
on JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) p. 2825. Property within the state belonging to
non-residents cannot be reached and applied to the satisfaction of their creditors except by -proceedings substantially in ren.

FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS

(5th ed. 1925) p. 2839. The procedure under the statute is not explained, but
it would seem to provide for notice by publication to non-resident stockholders, and an action begun in Superior Court. Such a proceeding in personam
against a non-resident stockholder is clearly without jurisdiction, and the
statute seems to apply only to attachment which was available before the act
was passed.
"It was admitted by the defendant's attorney on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court that if the interpretation of the North Carolina Court
was correct, its decision was also correct. Upon this admission the United
States Court refused to hear further arguments in the case. Raleigh (N. C.)
News and Observer, January 25, 1930, page 1, col. 4; United States Daily,
January 27, 1930, page 11, col. 7.
'See generally, Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32. 14 S. E. 521, 17 A. L. R.
330 (1892) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§2710-2717.
2Elizabeth
City Cotton Mills v. Dunstan, 121 N. C. 12. 27 S. E. 1001, 61
Am. St. Rep. 654 (1897) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1165.
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'whether for such personal liability he had had a sufficient day in
court to comply with the rule of due process.
If the levy is a judgment and therefore void, the privilege of appeal given by the statute cannot cure the defect.
A. W. GHOLSON,

JR.

Contracts-Anticipatory Breach-Mailing of Letter as Test
of Time and Place of Repudiation
Before the time for delivery under a contract of sale, the buyer
in Kansas wrote and mailed a notice of repudiation to the seller in
-Ohio. Held: that the renunciation constituted a breach when and
'where the letter was posted.I
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, which is well
,established,2 allows the aggrieved party an option of remedies, 3 but
there is an immediate duty to mitigate damages. 4 Although the anticipatory breach gives rise to a present cause of action, 5 the party
'in default may withdraw his repudiation, and thus revive the previ-ous contractual relations, provided the breach has not been accepted,
.or has not caused the innocent party to change his position.6
1

Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F (2d) 822
(C. C. A. 6th, 1929). The question of where the breach occurred was decided
in order to determine where the cause of action arose so that the proper statute
of limitations could be applied.
2 Where a party to an executory contract repudiates his obligations before
the time for performance, the opposite party may immediately sue for damages.
Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 Ellis & Bl. 678 (1853) ; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S.
1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. ed. 953 (1900) ; Bryant v. So. Box and Lumber Co.,
192 N. C. 607, 135 S. E. 531 (1926). Contra: Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass.
530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874) ; Carstens v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N. W. 757
(1894).
' He may bring an action for damages before performance is due, await the
actual breach, or rescind the agreement. United Press Ass'n v. National
Newspaper Ass'n, 237 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 8th., 1916).
"Although the injured party chooses to keep the contract alive, he will not
be awarded damages he could have prevented, after notice of the repudiation.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §1298; Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed.
486 (C. C. A. 8th., 1899) ; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. D. 300, 50 N. W. 836, 16 L.
R. A. 655 (1891). Contra: Roebling's Sons Co. v. Lock Stitch Fence Co., 130
Ill. 660, 22 N. E. 518 (1789) ; McAlister v. Safley, 65 Ia. 719, 23 N. W. 139
(1885); Michael v. Hart, [1902] 1 K. B. 482.

'Supra note 2.

Void, Withdrawal of Repudiation after Anticipatory Breach of Contract
(1926) 5 TEX. L. R.. 9; Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. St. 541 (1881) ; Swiger v.
Hayman, 56 W. Va. 123, 48 S. E. 839, 107 Am. St. Rep. 899 (1904); Iowa
Mausoleum Co. v. Wright, 170 Ia. 546, 153 N. W. 94 (1915); Independent
Milling Co. v. Howe Scales Co., 105 Kan. 87, 181 Pac. 554 (1919).
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The courts all require the repudiation to be distinct, unequivocal,
and absolute. 7 The instant case is unique, however, in denying the
proposition that it must also be communicated.3 Wester v. Casein
Co. of America,9 from New York, the sole domestic authority cited
by the court in support of this exceptional doctrine, is not in point.
In a later New York case1 0 the court held that an anticipatory breach
occurred when a letter renouncing the contract was received, and
showed that the opinion in the Wester case rested on the fact that
the aggrieved party had expressly made the telegraph company its
agent to receive the message, which, as it happened, was a repudiation. Another decision"1 from the same jurisdiction held a letter
of repudiation which reached the addressee after the time for performance did not excuse his failure to make a tender, even though
the renunciation had been mailed before performance was due.
An English case' 2 furnishes authority for the doctrine that a
repudiation does not have to be communicated to be effective, but not
for the doctrine that the breach occurs at the time and place the
message of repudiation is delivered for transmission. Here a marriage agreement was held to be breached in Germany, where the
defendant renounced the contract and evidenced her renunciation
by mailing a letter to the plaintiff in England. The act of renouncing
and not the act of mailing was expressly the determining factor in
the decision.
There is no apparent reason why a message delivered to the
mails or a telegraph company for transmission should be an exception
to the rule in this country that a repudiation must be communicated.
In lieu of an understanding to the contrary, the medium of comJohnstone v. Milling, 34 L. T. 629, 16 Q. B. D. 460 (Eng. 1886) ; Dingley v.
Oler, 117 U. S. 490, 6 Sup. Ct. 850, 29 L. ed. 984 (1886) ; Edwards v. Proctor,
173 N. C. 41, 91 S. E. 584 (1917).
8 To set up an anticipatory breach the claimant must show that notice of the
repudiation was given before time for performance. Terrell v. Nelson, 177
Ala. 596, 58 So. 989 (1912). Failure to tender performance is not excused by
a letter of repudiation that was not received until after performance was due.
Makepeace v.Dilltown Smokeless Coal Co., 179 App. Div. 60, 166 N. Y. S. 92
(1917). Intention not to perform is not a breach. Rauer's Law and Collection Co. v. Harrell, 32 Cal. App. 45, 162 Pac. 125 (1917). Letter of repudiation
not effective until received. Glynn v. Hyde-Murphy Co., 113 Misc. Rep. 329,
184 N. Y. S. 462 (1920).
1206 N. Y. 506, 100 N. E. 488, Ann. Cas. 1914B 377 (1912).
" Glynn v. Hyde-Murphy Co., supra note 8.
" Makepeace v. Dilltown Smokeless Coal Co., supra note 8.
Cherry v. Thompson, L. R. 7 Q. B. 573 (Eng. 1872).
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munication is the agent of the sender to carry information,'8 but
adherence to the doctrine under discussion would make it the compulsory agent of the sendee without his knowledge or consent.

W. T.

COVINGTON, JR.

Contracts-Consideration-Promise Not to Assign Note
and to Keep Matter Secret
In a recent North Carolina case' the widow of an insolvent defaulter signed a note not under seal to the amount of the defalcation
payable to the firm from which her husband had embezzled. Her
only assets at the time of the signing were moneys derived from a
life insurance policy belonging to her husband, of which she was
beneficiary. It was agreed that the note should be held without publicity of any kind and not turned over to any bank. In an action to
enforce collection of the note it was held that there was no consideration to support her promise to pay. The promise to observe silence
and not to assign was called "sentimental rather than valuable."
It is generally held that a note given by a widow in payment of
a debt owed by her husband, who was insolvent at the time of his
death, is void without a new consideration to support it.2 Nor does
the surrender of the old note provide such consideration. 8 Where
the estate is solvent a different result -obtains.4 Moral obligation
arising out of kinship does not ordinarily afford consideration to
support a promise to pay another's debt. 5 This doctrine appears to
"Glynn v. Hyde-Murphy Co., supra note 8.
1 People's Building and Loan Association v. Swaim, 198 N. C. 14, 150 S. E.

668 (1929).
'Paxon v. Niels, 137 Pa. 385, 20 Atl. 1016 (1891) ; Sykes v. Moore, 115
Miss. 508, 76 So. 538 (1917) ; Bank v. Hunter, 243 Mich. 516, 220 N. W. 665
(1928) ; Ferrell v. Scott, 2 Speers, 344, 42 Am3 Dec. 371 (S. C., 1844) ; Gilbert
v. Brown, 29 Ky. L. R. 1248, 97 S. W. 40 (1906) ; Cf. Shroeder v. Fink, 60 Md.
436 (1883): Contra: Nowlin v. Weson, 93 Ala. 509, 8 So. 800 (1891); Cf.
Wilton v. Eaton, 127 Mass. 174 (1880) ; Rathfon v. Loacher, 215 Pa. 571, 64
Adt. 790 (1906).
'Paxon v. Niels, supra note 2.
'Steep v. Harpham, 241 Mich. 652, 217 N. W. 787 (1928) ; Cawthorpe v.
Clark, 173 Mich. 267, 138 N. W. 1075 (1912). But cf. Rosenberg v. Ford, 85
Cal. 612, 24 Pac. 779 (1890) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. 193, 33 Pac. 862
(1893).
'Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. 482, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ex. 1840);
Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252 (1855); Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec.
453 (1861) ; Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, 198 Ky. 167, 248 S. W. 502 (1923). See,
for a comprehensive discussion of this problem, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)"437, and
cases there cited.
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be strictly enforced where the heirs of an insolvent debtor promise

to indemnify his creditors. 6
Seemingly there is in the instant case more than moral obligation
as consideration to support the promise. The fact that the promisee
obligated himself not to assign the note and to observe silence with
regard to the defalcation, would seem to satisfy the technical and

venerable requirement of a detriment to the promisee 7 as a surrender
of a valuable privilege.

Where the parties are equally capable of self-protection, the
adequacy of consideration will not be examined.8

But where the

enforcement of a contract would work a manifest injustice, and
where enforcement is wholly dependent upon a completely technical
consideration, courts have frequently seen fit to ignore such a cnnsideration. 9
In the instant case the ratio decedendi, prooably based upon the

constitutional provision for the protection of life insurance in the
hands of widows,' 0 seems to have brought about an eminently just

result.
T.

J. GoLD,

JR.

'XMcJelven
v. Stone, 56 Ga. 208 (1876) (holding that moral obligation was.
not sufficient consideration for a son's promise to pay his bankrupt father's
debts, under a section of the Georgia Code declaring good consideration to be"
such as is founded on natural duty and affection) ; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf.
273, 6 Am. Dec. 513 (Va. 1814) ; Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, supra note 5.
WILLISTON on CoNTRAcTs, (1924) §113;'Riddle v. Hudson, 68 Okl. 172, 172
Pac. 921 (1919). Notes given for the purpose of procuring abandonment of
criminal proceeding are void, McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn. 221, 36 Am. R. 67
(1882). But cf. Switzer v. Am,. R. R. Exp. Co., 133 S. E. 98 (S. C. 1926). It
is submitted in the instant case that the objection that the note is void on
grounds of public policy could not arise, the criminal action dying with the
embezzler.
'Fairchild v. Cartwright, 39 Cal. App. 118, 178 Pac. 333 (1918) ; Meyer v.
Nelson, 69 Colo. 56, 168 Pac. 1175 (1917); Yaryan Rosin & Turp. Co. v..
Haskins, 29 Ga. App. 753, 116 S. E. 913 (1923) ; Nolan v. Young, 220 S. W.
154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' Luing v. Peterson, 143 Minn. 6, 172 N. W. 692 (1919) ; Cotton v. Graham,
84 Ky. 672, 2 S. W. 647 (1887) ; Grimes v. Grimes, 28 Ky. L. R. 549, 89 S. W.
548 (1905), holding that where deceased's estate was hopelessly insolvent, his
widow's promise to pay an outstanding debt against the estate was without
consideration, although a creditor, in reliance thereon destroyed a note given
him by the deceased; White v. Bluett 2 C. L. R. 301, 23 L. J. Ex. 36 2 W. R.
75 (1853) (forbearance on part of son to make complaints to father held no
consideration, "By the argument a principle is pressed to an absurdity, as a
bubble is blown until it bursts").
" N. C. Const. Art. 10, §7.
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Contributory Negligence-Last Clear ChanceStop, Look and Listen
In a recent federal case' the plaintiff was hit by a train at a blind
crossing. He looked and listened, slowing down to five miles per
hour, but did not come to a complete stop because of the position of
the watchman, who was standing to one side across the tracks, looking in the opposite direction. After getting on the tracks the watchman suddenly rushed out to stop the plaintiff in such a manner that
he stalled his engine with the train about 500 feet away. I-teld,
judgment for plaintiff reversed. A non-suit should have been
granted, as he failed to stop and thus made chance, not precaution,
his guarantee of safety.
2
There has been a growing tendency, since the Goodman case, to
make failure to stop at a crossing with an obstructed view negligence
Per se.3 Some of the courts so holding have, nevertheless, made an
exception 4 where the railroad has established a means upon which
travelers are, partially, permitted to rely. The presence of a watchman does not absolve all duty of care by the traveler 5 but it does
require less care, and this situation usually is a question for the jury
as distinguished from the Goodman case. Ipso facto the majority
'fBaltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Shaw, 35 F (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929).
'Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72
L. ed. 167 (1927). Discussed in: (1928) 3 ALA. L. JouR. 136; (1928) 16 CALIF.
L. REv. 238; (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 250; (1928).3 IND. L. JouR. 478; (1928) 26
MICH L. REv. 582; (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 86; (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rav. 212;
(1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 321; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 532.
'Chicago, G. W. Ry. Co. v. Biwer, 266 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920);
Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Boyden, 269 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1921), (giving
the Penna. rule, the trial being in that state) ; But cf. Payne v. Shotwell, 273
Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 3rd., 1921). For the state holdings, Koster v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., 78 Cal. 233, 279 Pac. 788 (1929), discussed in (1930) 18
CALIF. L. Rav. 203; Williams v. Iola Electric Ry., 102 Kan. 268, 170 Pac. 397
(1918) ; Crandall v. Hines, 121 Me. 11, 115 Atl. 464 (1921) ; Benner v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 Atl. 283, 2 A. L. R. 759 (1918) ; Beckwith v. Spokane Internat'l Ry. Co., 120 Wash. 91, 206 Pac. 921 (1922).
'Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Slayton, 29 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928)
Vaca v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 91 Cal. App. 470, 267 Pac. 346 (1928). Contra:
O'Neill v. Reading Co., 296 Pa. 319, 145 Atl. 840 (1929) (Absolute duty to
stop. Open gates and negligence in shutting gates no excuse for failure to
stop) ; cf. Serfas v. Lehigh & N. E. R. Co., 270 Pa. 306, 113 Atl. 370 (1921)
(Rule of law, peremptory, absolute and unbending; jury should never be permitted to pare it away by distinctions and exceptions).
'Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Elvins, 176 Ark. 737, 4 S. W. (2d) 528 (1928);
Moeller v. Missouri Pac. .R. Co., 272 S. W. 990 (Mo. App. 1925). Cf. Landers
v. Erie R. Co., 244 Fed. 72 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Vascacillas v. Southern Pac.
Co., 247 Fed. 8 (C. C. A., 1918).
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rule,8 which holds that failure to stop must be viewed under the
circumstances, would be unlikely to result in a non-suit in such cases.
North Carolina is in the latter class7 and goes so far as to say that
the presence of a watchman is an assurance of safety and an ample
invitation to cross, upon which the traveler may presume it safe.8
The principal case goes further than the Goodman case and is a vast
extension away from the principle recognizing a traveler's equality
with the railroad at a grade crossing.9
- (1919) 1 A. L.R. 198 and note; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 405, 424; (1908) 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 963, 967; good discussion of the relative merits in (1921)
21 COL. L. REv. 290; Beckham v. Hines, 279 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ;
Allen v. B. & M. R. Co., 197 Mass. 298, 83 N. E. 863 (1908) ; Crabtree v. Missouri Pac. R. 86, Neb. 33, 124 N. W. 932 (1910); Dobbs v. West Jersey &
Seashore, R., 78 N. J. L. 679, 75 Atl. 905 (1910) ; Payne v. Brown, 133 Va. 222,
112 S. E. 833 (1922). States with the humanitarian doctrine send it to the

jury usually, Zumwalt v. Chicago &A. R. Co., 266 S. W. 717 (Mo. 1924); cf.

Lincks v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 143 La. 445, 78 So. 730 (1918). In two states
contributory negligence cannot be a matter of law by the constitution and it is
always a question for the jury. Pacific Const. Co. v. Cochran, 29 Ariz. 554,
243 Pac. 405 (1926); Oklahoma. Union Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 115 Okl. 146, 242
Pac. 176 (1925).
Hunt v. R. R., 170 N. C. 442, 87 S. E. 210 (1915) ; Dail v. R. R., 176 N. C.
111, 96 S. E. 734 (1918); N. C. Public Laws, c. 148, §6 (1927), ch. 222 §1
(1929) ; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1927) §2621 (48) ; (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rv.212.
' Shepard v. R. R., 166 N. C. 539, 82 S. E. 872 (1914) ; Goff v. R. R., 179
N. C. 216, 102 S. E. 320 (1920) ; Barber v. R. R., 193 N. C. 691, 138 S. E. 17
(1927) (Where a railroad company maintains a flagman at a crossing, whether
voluntarily, by law, or by custom, the public generally. has a right to presume
that this safeguard will be reasonably maintained and attended to, and in the
absence of knowledge to the contrary, the fact that the flagman is absent from
his post, or, if present, is not giving the warning of danger, is an ample invitation to cross, upon which a traveler familiar with the crossing may rely and
act). Cf. Cooper v. R. R., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391
(1905) ; Perry v. R. R., 180 N. C. 290, 104 S. E. 673 (1920) (Holdinj that if
failure to stop was caused by breach of duty on part of R. R., in that it failed
to giv;e any notice of the approach of the train, then it could not be said as a
legal conclusion that it was contributory negligence); see Russell v. Carolina
Cent. R. R., 118 N. C. 1098, 24 S. E. 512 (1896) (Duty to stop is the peculiar
province of the jury to pass upon) ; and see Harrison v. R. R. 194 N. C. 656,
140 S. E. 598 (1927) (Rule in Goodman Case is considered just another way of
stating the prudent man theory). For the other states following this cf. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Prewitt's Adm'r., 203 Ky. 147, 262 S. W. 1
(1924) ; State v. B. & 0. R. Co., 145 At. 611 (Md. 1929) ; Wiggin v. B. & M.
R. Co., 75 N. H. 600, 75 At. 103 (1910) ; Passarello v. West Jersey & S. R.

Co., 98 N. J. L. 790, 121 AtI. 708 (1923)

(Failure of flagman to do duty and

give proper warning is prima facie negligence of R. R.); Southern Ry. v.

Stockdon, 106 Va. 693, 56 S. E. 713 (1907).

But cf. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.

Webb, 90 Ala. 185, 8 So. 518 (1890).
' Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, 24 L. ed. 403 (1877)
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Rebmann, 285 Fed. 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) (Railroad's precedence conditioned upon duty to give due and timely warning of
approach. People have equal right to travel on the highways as railroads have
to run trains) : cf. U. S. Director Gen'l. of R. R. v. Zanzinger, 269 Fed. 552 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1920) (Necessity to stop, look and listen is based on reasonable,
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In the principal case it is submitted that even if the plaintiff was
negligent in going upon the tracks the watchman was subsequently
negligent in stopping him in a dangerous position. The plaintiff by
his negligence had gotten into a perilous position and the watchman
saw him and owed the care of an ordinary prudent man under the
circumstances to extricate the plaintiff and avoid the accident. 10
The plaintiff's negligence, being seen and known, brings this under
the conscious last clear chance doctrine which all the courts recognize in one form or another."
It is submitted that the principal case puts an undue burden upon
the traveler of attracting the watchman's attention to get an invi•tation 12 to cross. It is also an encroachment upon the province of
the jury. The railroads's and travelers should be equally encouraged
to increase their diligence and when the railroad is at fault it would
best serve society to spread the loss, through injury or death, by
prudent man under all the circumstances and one of the circumstances is right
to expect a warning from R. R. The presumption is in favor of the traveler as

his safety is involved).
'Van Sickler v. Washington & 0. D. Ry., 142 Va. 857, 128 S. E. 367
(1925) ; McGowan v. Tayman, 144 Va. 358, 132 S. E. 316 (1926).
' (1927) 26 MICHIGAN L. REV. 460; (1927) 1 DAK. L. REV. 51; (1927) 61
AMERICAN L. Rxv. 929. For particularly good discussion of entire subject see
Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C.
L. REv. 3, 21. This was clearly brought out in the charge to the jury in the
Lower Court. "If the flagman, in the exercise of reasonable care and prudent
judgment, knew or should have known that he could not have stopped Shaw or
that Shaw could not have stopped the automobile in which he was riding, considering his rate of speed, before getting upon the track, and, if the watchman
in the exercise of that same discretion, prudence and care, knew or should have
known that Shaw could have passed over and thus avoided injury, then it was
the duty of the watchman to permit him to pass, but that permission to pass is
predicated upon the knowledge that he could not stop, in time to avoid running
upon the track." This is usually a question for the jury, Curtis v. R. R., 130
N. C. 437, 41 S. E. 929 (1902), and see (1926), 5 N. C. L. REV. 58, unless the
evidence is so overwhelming that only one inference is possible, Coleman v.
Norfolk & West. Ry. Co., 100 W. Va. 679, 131 S. E. 563 (1926). In the principal case there are reasonable doubts. The U. S. Supreme Court and many
state courts have gone so far as to recognize the unconscious last clear chance
where it was defendant's duty to exercise due care to discover the plaintiff's
peril, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Ellzey, 275 U. S. 236, 48 Sup. Ct. 80,
72 L. ed. 259 (1927) ; Haynes v. R. R., 182 N. C. 679, 110 S. E. 56 (1921).
' The court says, "The watchman was there and the sounding of the truck's
horn would have caused him to turn and give the proper signal to come or
wait." Should this responsibility be all placed on the traveler and the railroad
be relieved of all care in picking competent watchmen? Under this rule it
would be nearly impossible to have an accident whereby the Railroad would
have any liability.
' The railroads have used the Goodman Case in posters and thus we see the
railroad's opinion of the decision as involving a shift of responsibility to the
traveler.
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making it an item of the cost of maintenance.
desirable than the result of the principal case.

This seems more

HUGH B.

CAMPBELL.

Corporations-Non-Cumulative Preferred StockParticipation in Past Undistributed Profits
In 1927, the directors of a corporation declared a dividend-the
first since the organization of the corporation in 1915-from profits
which had accumulated over a period of twelve years. The plaintiffs,
owners of non-cumulative preferred stock, sought to enjoin the payment of this dividend to junior shareholders until the directors had
paid to the plaintiffs preferential dividends alleged to -have been
earned, but not distributed to them, in previous years. A Federal
District Court in New York denied plaintiffs injunctive relief.1 But,
in 1929, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision and held
that the non-declaration of dividends from the profits earned in
previous years made the corporation a dividend debtor to the plaintiffs to the extent of their preferential right to share in the corporation's yearly profits, and that this debt must be paid before dividends
to junior stockholders could be declared. 2 Then, in 1930, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals.3 It decided that, since the profits made in
previous years had been devoted each year to capital improvements
instead of dividends, the non-cumulative, preferred shareholders had
no claim to the past invested profits. The reason given was that "a
common and reasonable" interpretation of the nature of non-cumulative stock gives to its holders the right to share only in the declared
dividends of any given year and precludes any right to share in
undistributed profits earned in past years.
Since the right of any shareholder to participate in the profits of
a corporation is a contract right the nature of which is determined
by the particular type of stock owned by him, 4 a preliminary test in
' Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 23 F. (2d) 691 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
'Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
'Wabash Ry. Co. et al. v. Barclay, 50 Sup. Ct. 106 (1930).
'Day v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe, etc. Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302
(1924); Continental Ins. Co. v. Minn., etc. Ry. Co., 290 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923) ; Scott v. Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co., 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl. 327 (1901) ; Elkins
v. Camden, etc. Ry. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 233 (1882). See Note (1929) 14 CORN.
L. Q. 341, 342. "Corporate charters are contracts and preferred stock created
by such charters carries only the iights derived from the charter provisions."
Berle, Non-Cuinulative Preferred Stock (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 358.
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determining the rights of shareholders to dividends would naturally
be an examination of their stock certificates and the corporate charters authorizing the issuance thereof. But, this test has been of little
value in determining the dividend rights of non-cumulative, preferred
stockholders because, in most cases, their certificates merely state that
their dividends shall be non-cumulative without any further defining
provision. 5 The instant case affords an excellent illustration. There
the stock certificates merely provided that holders "were entitled to
receive preferential dividends in each fiscal year * * * before any
dividends shall be paid upon any other stock of the company, but
such preferential dividends shall be non-cumulative."6
A variety of other tests have been offered as the basis for deter-

mining the meaning of "non-cumulative preferred stock."'7 Possibly
the most common meaning, and that adopted by the Supreme .Court,
denies to such stockholders the right to share in past, undistributed
profits. 8 Writers on corporation finance, however, and a few courts
have contended that non-cumulative shareholders do have a right to
share in past, accumulated profits, whether declared or not, and that
a sum equal to the amount due them shall be earmarked each year
when earned and set aside on the books of the corporation. 9
The chief objection to be urged against the ruling of the Supreme
Court is that it affords those directors of a corporation who might
"Note (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 341; Note (1925) 11 VA. L. Rlv. 353; Berle,
Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, supra note 4._
'Supra note 3.
'Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, supra note 4; Note (1929) 14
CoRN. L. Q. 341; Note (1926) 74. U. OF PA. L. Rav. 605.
'New York, L. E. and W. Ry. Co. v. Nickals, 119 U. S. 296, 7 Sup. Ct.
209 30 L. ed. 363 (1886) ; Lyman v. Southern Ry. Co., 149 Va. 274, 141 S. E.
240 (1928). See also, supra note 5.
"Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron etc. Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 514 (1909);
Moran v. U. S. Cast Iron etc. Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 At. 546 (1924), aff'd.
96 N. J. Eq. 698, 126 Atl. 329 (1925) ; Collins v. Electric Portland Power Co.,
7 F. (2d) 221 (D. Ore. 1925), aft'd. 12 F. (2d) 671, (C. C. A. 9th, 1926);
Kurtz v. Electric Portland Power Co., 7 F. (2d) 221 (D. Ore. 1925), aff'd. 12
F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ; Day v. U. S. Cast Iron etc. Co., 95 N. J.
Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546 (1924), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302 (1925);
Berle, Non-Cumulative Stock, supra note 4. See also citations, supra note 4.
It has been suggested that the result of the decision of the Circuit Court
in the above case would be to extend the meaning of "non-cumulative stock"
to a degree even more favorable to holders of this type of stock than that
expressed by the stock experts in that it would not only allow such holders
the right to participate in past undeclared profits but would also impose a
"restriction on directorate discretion" by preventing the directors from declaring even a single year's dividend to the junior shareholders until the holders
of non-cumulative stock have been paid their share of all the past dividends
due them. Note (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 241, 345.
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be partial to junior shareholders the opportunity of discriminating
against holders of non-cumulative preferred stock by allowing the
profits of the corporation to accumulate over a period of years instead
of declaring dividends from the profits as they accrue each year. 10
However, a court of equity will compel directors to declare a dividend
where it is clear that a fraudulent accumulation of profits is being
allowed." But it is obvious that the relief to be obtained from such
a remedy is more apparent than real because of the great difficulty
in proving such a discrimination and the reluctance of equity to interfere with corporate management. 12 The result of the instant decision at least gives a definite legal meaning to "non-cumulative preferred stock" and requires, in order to protect the holders of such
stock from discrimination by a partial corporate directorate, the insertion of express provisions in corporate charters and stock certificates entitling the holders of non-cumulative preferred stock to participate in those profits which have accumulated over a period of
years upon which yearly dividends have not been declared.
J. FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
Evidence-Effect of Uncontradicted Rebutting Evidence on Presumption of Respondeat Superior in Automobile Accidents
Among the many problems that have arisen because of the
widespread use of automotive transportation is the one dealing with
the increasing number of automobile accidents. Statistics supplied
by the National Safety Council of Chicago show that motor vehicle
fatalities have increased at the rate of approximately two thousand
per year since 1925 despite the more efficient precautionary methods
See Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, supra note 4, for detailed
illustration of how the accumulation of profits over a period of years will
affect holders of non-cumulative preferred stock.
It is true as a general proposition that directors of a corporation, in allowing profits to accumulate over a period of years, have some sound business
reason for so doing, but it is not improbable that in many cases the real reason
for allowing profits to accumulate is the desire of the directors to further their
own financial interests-if they own junior stock, either directly or indirectly.
Hazeltine v. Belfast, etc. Ry. Co., 79 Me. 411, 10 At. 328, 1 Am. St. Rep.
330 (1887); In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1917); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668, 3 A. L. R. 413 (1919) ; Cannon
v. Wischassett Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 141 S. E. 344 (1928). It should be
noted, however, that a declaration of dividends from those profits which are
in excess of a working capital can be required by any shareholder under N. C.
Cons. Stat. Ann (1919) §1178.
"Morse v. Boston and M. R. R., 263 Mass. 308, 160 N. E. 894 (1928);
Fernald v. Frank Ridlon Co., 246 Mass. 64, 140 N. E. 421 (1923).
10
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of avoiding them which are in use today. When one considers the
fact that more United States citizens are killed every year by automobiles than were killed in the late war and that for every person
killed there are approximately thirty-five persons injured,' it is quite
easy to sympathize, not only with those who have been injured, but
also with the courts of this country which are faced with the problem of dealing justice in the thousands of suits which have arisen
as a result of automobile accidents. Some of the practical difficulties
with which the courts and the parties are confronted in the handling
of such suits under the present system are: (1) "The difficulty, delay, expense, annoyance, and uncertainty of litigation, in which the
determination of negligence and the exact amount of damage are involved; (2) the failure of compensation in many cases because of the
financial irresponsibility of many defendants; and, (3) the economic
'2
loss and personal hardship resulting from uncompensated injuries."
Expert committees, legislators, and lawyers have advocated the adoption of one or more of the following remedies :3 (1) Special courts
to try motor vehicle cases ;4 (2) shifting the burden of proof, not
only in suits against drivers for negligent injuries caused by them,
but also by extending the doctrine of respondeat superior;5 (3) re-

quiring automobile owners to take out liability insurance ;e (4) compulsory liability laws to be administered by Special Boards.7 The
'See Ballantine, A Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Feb.
1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 97.

'Supra note 1.
"Last June work was begun by a voluntary committee known as the
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents. Funds have
been provided by the Rockefeller Foundation and the work is being conducted
under the auspices of the Council for Research in the Social Sciences of Columbia University, with the aid of the School of Law of Yale University. The
Committee is composed largely of lawyers and was initiated as an effort on
the part of lawyers to determine whether an unsatisfactory legal situation can
be met by new methods." Supra note 1, p. 97. The organization of this committee is probably a result of the beneficial work done by smaller committees
in a number of the states.
' Special courts would reduce delay and tend to develop a simplified practice,
but this remedy alone would not cure the difficulty of proving negligence or
insure the financial responsibility of defendants. Also, only the populous districts could afford the expense of such courts.
'For a discussion as to the extent and method of shifting the burden of
proof in such cases, see comment in this issue of the N. C. LAw REv., p. 309.
' Ten states have adopted laws tending to increase the financial responsibility
of automobile owners for injuries caused by their automobiles. See Ballantine,
Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents, supra note 1, at page 99.
See also, Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle
Accidents (1928) 76 U. of PA. L. Rav. 690.
In the "compulsory liability plan," it is believed, lies the ultimate solution
to the automobile accident problem. Analogy can be found in the almost uni-
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extensive employment of presumptions today in extending the doc-

trine of respondeat superior suggests a discussion of their effect in
automobile accident cases.
A recent North Carolina cases not only approves the apparently
general rule that proof of ownership of car plus proof that the
driver was acting within the general employment of the owner creates
a prima facie case that the driver was acting within the course of his
employment at the time of the injury,9 but also raises the question
whether the direct, uncontradicted' o evidence of a defendant when
offered in rebuttal of such a prima facie case entitles him to a directed
verdict." In this case, a negro, employed by the defendant corporation to drive its truck, injured the plaintiff while driving the truck.
Defendant offered direct, uncontradicted evidence that it had ordered
the negro not to drive the truck without express orders, that the
negro was driving the truck at the time of the injury without express
orders, and that the driver was, at that time, on his way to see his
sick mother during lunch hour. The Supreme Court held that defendant's motion for non-suit was properly overruled and that the
jury was justified in finding for the plaintiff. In discussing this
problem two questions arise at the outset, namely whether a defendant under such circumstances is always entitled as a matter of right to
versal enactment of Workmen's Compensation Acts and the efficacy of such
acts (in which compensation is fixed by statute regardless of the fault of the
parties) has been well established. This plan has also been suggested as a
workable device in settling similar problems arising railroad accidents. Note
(1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 50, 51. See also Ballantine, Study of Compensation
for Automobile Accidents, supra note 1; Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory
Ins., etc., supra note 6.
'Jeffrey v. Osage Manufacturing Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
'It is generally held that proof of ownership plus proof of general employment creates a presumption of respondeat superior. In some courts, mere proof
of ownership is sufficient to raise such a presumption. Still others impose the
heavier burden of the risk of non-persuasion upon the defendant automobile
owner. For discussion of above rules, see HUDDY on AUToBiOBILEs (7th ed.)
§§795, 796; (1930) 10 BosToN U. L. REv. 83; comment in this issue of N. C, L.
REv.,
10 p. 309.
By "uncontradicted evidence of defendant" is meant that evidence of the
defendant which has not been opposed by the contradicting, direct evidence of
the plaintiff. It is clear that even the circumstantial evidence of a plaintiff
might "contradict," in a sense, the evidence of a defendant.
' Although North Carolina does not allow a peremptory ruling in favor of
the one having the burden of proof in the primary sense, i.e. the burden of
the issue, Anniston Nat. Bank v. School Committee of Durham, 121 N. C.
107, 28 S. E. 134 (1897), there would apparently be no objection to allowing
a directed verdict for a defendant automobile owner, because the burden of
proof in the primary sense is not on him, but still remains upon the plaintiff
to ultimately prove negligence.
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a peremptory ruling of the court and, if not, when is he entitled to
such a ruling.
At first glance it would seem that a defendant should always be
entitled to a favorable ruling when he has offered uncontradicted
evidence in opposition to a presumption because the rule that a presumption disappears upon the production of rebutting evidence 12
would seemingly leave the plaintiff, who has relied solely upon the
presumption, without any case. However true the statement as to
the presumption's disappearance may be, it does not always follow
that the plaintiff is actually left without support, because, granting
that the presumption does disappear, there are still left the proved
facts upon which the presumption was based which are circumstantial
or inferential evidence to be weighed against the direct evidence of
the defendant. For example, proof of the fact that X has in his
possession stolen goods, upon which the presumption that X stole
them is based, 13 is strong circumstantial evidence, irrespective of the
presumption, that X actually stole the goods; and, proof of the facts
that a letter was duly addressed, stamped, mailed, upon which the
presumption that said letter was received by the addressde' 4 is based,
is cogently inferential of the fact that the letter was received.
However, the facts upon which many presumptions are based are
not always as persuasive as those illustrated by the situations in the
foregoing paragraph, and in fact, there are some presumptions which
are altogether devoid of any inferential force whose existence is
justified solely upon the ground of policy. Thus, a statutory presumption' 5 of negligence against a railway company upon proof that
plaintiff was injured by its train is not based as much upon the probability that such injuries usually result from the negligence of the
company as upon the policy of requiring the defendant railroad to
come forward with certain facts peculiarly within its own knowledge
which are essential to an expeditious and fair determination of the
case. The presumption that goods damaged in transit were injured
by the last connecting carrier is a striking example of a presumption
"5 WIGmoRE, EviDENCE (1923) §2491; McCormick, Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5 N. C. L. Rav. 291, 297.
' State v. Van Buren, 30 Del. 79, 102 Atl. 981 (1918) ; State v. Court, 225
Mo. 609, 125 S. W. 451 (1910).

"Dunlop v. U. S., 165 U. S. 486, 17 Sup. Ct. 375, 41 L. ed. 799 (1897);

Holloman v. Sou. R. Co., 172 N. C. 372, 90 S. E. 292 (1916).
' Miss. Ann. Code (Hemmingway, 1927) §1645. Mobile, etc., R. R. v.

Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 55 L. ed. 78 (1910).
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based solely upon policy without any "logical core,"' 10 because it is
just as probable that the damage was done by any other of the connecting carriers. So, where the presumption is based upon a strong
probability, it is clear that the plaintiff has made out a sufficient case
to go to the jury despite the defendant's direct evidence. Likewise,
it is equally obvious that where the presumption has no "logical
core," the plaintiff, when opposed by direct, uncontradicted evidence,
should be nonsuited because there are no legs upon which his case
can stand once the presumption has disappeared.
But, in the more numerous cases where the presumptions are
founded both upon probability and some basis of policy the decisions
reach varying results because of (1) the mistaken view of some
courts that the plaintiff has no case when the presumption disappears;
(2) the varying degrees of weight given to the probability element
in presumptions;17 and (3) the presence or absence of peculiar circumstances weakening or fortifying the credibility of the direct evidence of the defendant.1 s Thus, where defendant offered uncontradicted evidence in rebuttal of the presumption of negligence
against a railway company upon proof that its train killed plaintiff's
cattle, the defendant was allowed a directed verdict,' 0 whereas, in
another jurisdiction, in a case identical to the one above, it was held
that the case was one for the jury to determine. 20 Also, where defendant railway company offered evidence that its engines were
equipped with improved spark arresters, it was allowed a directed
verdict despite the presumption of negligence based upon proof that
plaintiff's land adjoining defendant's tracks was burned. 2 ' Further,
" Chafee, Progressof the Law, Evidence (1921), 35 HARV. L. REV. 302, 311.
See also, Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof (1920) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307, 317, 320. THiAYER, TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE, 314. 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE, 1332, 1214.
'1For example, Court X might consider it highly probable that defendant

is guilty of manufacturing whiskey upon proof that a still was found upon
his premises, whereas, on the other hand, Court Y might consider it inprob-

able that defendant manufactured whiskey merely because a still was found

upon his land, and justify such a presumption mainly upon the ground that the
defendant
can easily disprove it and thereby expedite trial procedure.
"8Using same illustration, supra note 18, Court X might consider it less
probable that defendant was distilling whiskey upon proof that defendant's
premises comprised some thousand acres of land and that the still was found
quite a distance from his residence; and, Court Y might consider it probable
that defendant was guilty, if it were proved that the still was found in the
basement of the house in which defendant was dwelling.
"Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Shoecraft, 53 Ark. 96, 13 S. W. 422 (1890).
'Hardison v. Atl. etc. R. Co., 120 N. C. 492, 26 S. E. 630 (1897).
Menomenie, R. S. & D. Co. v. Ry. Co., 91 Wis. 447, 65 N. W. 176 (1895);

4 WxaIoRE,

EVIDENCE

(1923) §2487, page 3529.
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most courts hold that defendant's uncontradicted evidence that he
did not receive a letter offered against the presumption of receipt
based upon proof of proper mailing does not entitle him to a peremptory ruling,22 although some courts, under like circumstances, do
allow a directed verdict. 23 The same divergence of opinion is found
in cases involving the presumption that a person in control of defendant's motor vehicle is a servant acting within the course of his
employment. Some states hold that defendant's uncontradicted evidence should entitle him to a directed verdict, 24 the majority hold
that it should not.25 In those states belonging to the latter class,
however, there are numerous instances where plaintiff was nonsuited
upon the defendant's uncontradicted evidence, not because of any
rule that defendant was entitled to a favorable ruling as a matter of
right, but because the weight and credibility of the defendant's evidence in the particular case clearly overbore the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence. For example, where the defendant proved that the
accident occurred outside the working hours of the driver, 26 that the
driver was exclusively employed in work other than that of driving
defendant's car and was never permitted to drive it,27 that the driver
was clearly using the car for his own purpose and could not, under
the circumstances, have been using it for the defendant 28 and where
defendant's evidence is based upon the testimony of disinterested
witnesses, 29 a peremptory ruling has been given for the defendant.
Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 4 Sup. Ct. 382, 28 L. ed. 395 (1884) ;

Standard Tr. etc. Co. v. N. Y. etc. Bank, 166 N. C. 112, 81 S.E. 1074 (1914).
"1Grade v. Mariposa County, 132 Cal. 75, 64 Pac. 117 (1901) ; Ault v. Inter-

state Say. etc. Ass'n., 15 Wash. 627, 47 Pac. 13 (1896).
"4Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn. 538, 205 S.W. 434 (1918) ; Nattans v. Cotton,

133 Atl. 270 (Md. 1926); Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md. 403, 121 Atl. 238 (1923).
See also, Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S.W. 854 (1917), but compare
with Barz v. Fleishman Yeast Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S.W. 361 (1925).
"D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Dowdell v.
Beasley, 17 Ala. App. 100, 82 Sou. 40 (1919); Crain v. Sumida, 59 Cal. App.
590, 211 Pac. 479 (1922) ; Ward v. Teller Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 60 Col.
47, 153 Pac. 219 (1915); Gallagher v. Gunn, 16 Ga. App. 600, 85 S. E. 930
(1915) ; Purdy v. Sherman, 74 Wash. 309, 133 Pac. 440 (1913).
" Guthrie v. Holmes, supra note 25.
'Reich v. Cone, 180 N. C. 267, 104 S.E. 530 (1920).
' Callahan v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 47 R. I. 361, 133 Atl. 442
(1926).

"It is undoubtedly the general rule that where unimpeaehed witnesses

testify distinctly and positively to a fact and are uncontradicted, their testimony
should be credited and have the effect of overcoming a mere presumption.
But this rule is subject to many qualifications. There may be such a degree
of improbability in the statements themselves as to deprive them of credit,
however positively made. The witnesses, though unimpeached, may have such
an interest in the question at issue as to affect their credibility.... And fur-
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It is submitted, in conclusion, that in deciding whether or not
defendant's uncontradicted direct evidence should entitle him to a
peremptory ruling, a court should first determine whether or not the
particular presumption has a logical core, i.e. a basis in probability.
If it does not, the ruling should be given, providing there is no
shadow upon the credibility of the defendant's evidence. If the presumption does have a basis of probability, then the weight of this
probability should be balanced against the evidence of the defendant,
as in any other case of conflict between circumstantial evidence (not
raising a technical presumption) and direct evidence, and a peremptory ruling for defendant given or refused upon the usual test of
whether or not reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion.

J. FRAZIER GLENN,

JR.

Insurance-Insurable Interest in Life of Copartner
A and H, partners in an insurance business, each took out a policy
on his life for the benefit of the partnership. The premiums were paid
out of the earnings of the business. There was a partnership dissolution, A selling all of his interest, except accounts and notes receivable. H surrendered the policy on A's life and demanded the cash
surrender value. A made demand for his proportionate share.
Held: that the policy, together with its cash surrender value, was a
partnership asset which passed to H.1
The instant case seems undoubtedly correct on the basis that if a
partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, then a
2
partnership has an insurable interest in the life of a partner.
Wagering policies were abolished in England by statutes.3 American courts have generally held, irrespective of statutes, that wagerthermore, it is often difficult to decide when a witness is, in a legal sense,
uncontradicted. He rhay be contradicted by circumstance as well as by statements of others contrary to his own. In such cases, courts and juries are not
bound to refrain from exercising their judgment and to blindly adopt the statements of the witness, for the simple reason that no other witness has denied
them, and that the character of the witness is not impeached." By Rapallo,
J., Elwood v. Western Union Co., 45 N. Y. 549, 553 (1871).
'Allen v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C.C. A. 8th, 1929).
'If a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, he has
it whether it is the whole or a fractional -part of the beneficial interest in the
policy. Since he has a fractional interest in the partnership, it would seem
that he had an insurable interest.
819 Geo. II, c. 37 and 14 Geo. III, c. 48.
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4
ing policies are against public policy. An insurable interest in the

lifd of another, which takes the policy out of the wagering class,5 has
been defined as that interest arising by the relation of blood, or
7
6
marriage, or business which gives a reasonable expectation of se8

curing benefit from the continuance of the life insured.

It is gen-

erally held that a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his
copartner.

9

10
The North Carolina case of Powell v. Dewey is generally con-

an insurable
sidered as contrary to the proposition that a partner has

interest in the life of his copartner.

But strictly speaking, that case

invested. The
is limited to the situation where there is no capital
weight of authe
against
"is
it
that
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from the
merely
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interest
thority" to assert that an insurable
and
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wholly
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seems
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has no authority in support.
College v. Inunwarrantedly to limit the effect of dictum in Trinity
12
surance Co.

The recent trend in the North Carolina decisions

to be alone in
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 125, n. 128. New Jersey seems
Howard v. Beneon
comment
296,
J.
L.
YALE
32
(1923)
contrary.
to
holding
ficial Assoc., 98 N. J. Law 297, 118 Atl. 449 (1922).
L. REv. 111,
'Lincoln S. Cain, Insurable Interest in Life (1926) 6 BosToN
120.
'Supra note 5.
674 (1888)
'Mace v. Provident Life Association, 101 N. C. 122, 7 S. E.
189, 44
(debtor-creditor); U. S. v. Supple-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. in life
interest
Sup. Ct. 546, 68 L. ed 970 (1924) (corporation has an insurable W. 958 (1899)
of an officer) ; Embry's Adm'r. v. Harris, 104 Ky. 61, 52 S.
Co. v. Car(surety may insure life of his principal) ; International Life Ins.
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rol, 17 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (three insolvents, jointly an insurable
liable on sundry obligation made in joint real estate deals, had
interest in the lives of each other).
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 129.
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498, 2 Sup. Ct. 949,
S. W.
27 L. ed. 800 (1883) ; Adam's Adm'r. v. Reed, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 858, 38
113
420 (1896) ; Rahders, Merritt & Hagler v. Peoples Bank of Minneapolis,
128, 68 S. E.
Minn. 496, 130 N. W. 16 (1911); Rush v. Howkins, 135 Ga.
Bevin v.
1035 (1910) ; Atkins v. Cotter, 145 Ark. 326, 224 S. W. 624 (1920) ;
v. Fleming,
The Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244 (1854); Fleming
insurable
194 Iowa 71, 184 N. W. 296 (1921). Texas and Colorado hold that
not be
interest ceases at the dissolution of the partnership and recovery can
; Ruth
had thereafter. Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Texas 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894)
v. Flynn, 26 Colo. App. 171, 142 Pac. 194 (1914).
"123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 381 (1898).
it Supra note 9.
113 N. C. 244, 248, 18 S. E. 175, 176 (1893), which states: "Under certain
his copartner.
conditions a partner has an insurable interest in the life of
pecuniarily
Insurance Co. v. Luchs. 108 U. S. 498. So one who is interested
insurable
in the future earnings of another under a contract with him as an
interest in his life."

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seems to indicate a more liberal view toward validating life insurance
policies.' 3 A possible relaxation of the "partnership view" may per14
haps be found in the construction of incontestable clauses.

A. K. SMITH,
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.

Master and Servant-Liability for Injury to Invitee
of Truck Driver
Is a truck owner liable for injuries to a boy who, invited to
ride on the running board by the driver without authority, was
injured when he was thrown off as the truck rounded a corner at
a rapid rate? The court held that the driver exceeded the scope
of his employment in inviting the boy to ride.' A similar result was
reached in another case when the secretary-treasurer of a company
invited plaintiff's intestate to ride in a company car which was
wrecked at a street intersection. 2 No evidence was introduced to
show that the secretary was given to the habit of carrying passengers
without authorization. Had this been established, defendant company might have been charged with constructive notice of violation
of its rule and hence, with its abrogation. 8
It is generally conceded that a servant has no implied authority
"In Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 67 S. E. 767 (1910),
after a thorough review of Trinity College v. Ins. Co., supra note 12, Powell
v. Dewey, supra note 10, Burbage v. Windley's Ex'rs., 108 N. C. 351, 128 S. E.
839, 12 L. R. A. 409 (1891), Hinton v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135
N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474, 65 L. R. A. 161 (1904), it was decided that, although
prior North Carolina cases seemed to refuse to allow the good faith assignment of life insurance to persons having no insurable interest, an assignment
would be valid where it was not a cloak to a wagering contract or transaction.
In American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. supra note 7, the validity of
N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1126 (5) 'passed as a result of Victor v.
Louise Mills, 148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908)] giving every corporation an
insurable interest in the life of any officer or agent whose death would cause
financial
loss to the corporation, was recognized.
"4 In American Trust Co. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 560, 92 S. E.
706, 709 (1917), there is the following dictum: "There is authority for the
position that the incontestable clause in a policy of insurance covers every
defense except that there was no insurable interest at the time of issuing the
policy (5 Elliott on Contracts, §4077), although the trend of modern authority
is that the clause, when it takes effect within a reasonable time after the issue
of the -policy and not from the date, cuts off all defenses except those specially
allowed by the clause itself."
I Cotton v. Carolina Truck Co.. 197 N. C. 709, 150 S. E. 505 (1929).
'Collar v. Grocery Co., 150 S. E. 2 (W. Va. 1929).
'Hammond v. Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 423, 143 S. E. 91 (1928).
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4
to invite or permit a third person to ride on the master's vehicle.
And when the driver has so exceeded his authority or violated his
express instructions, the invitee of the driver is in no better case as
regards the master than a trespasser.5 The master owes no duty to
the trespasser except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring
him.0 On the other hand, it has been held that the trespasser is not
deprived of all recourse against the master even in case of a negligent
injury.7 The owner of a motor truck or car is not bound to keep
a lookout for trespassers, nor to maintain his car in a reasonably safe
condition for them. But independent of the authority granted to the
driver, the duty to avoid injuring one whose presence and peril are
known is so imperative that it must apply even to trespassers. Thus
the driver, by his knowledge of the situation of the person he has
invited, places the master in the position of owing to the known trespasser ordinary care.8 Although the master is not required to exercise the same degree of care as where permission is authorized
ostensibly, 9 he is liable for a reckless injury by the servant who is
otherwise engaged about his master's business.10 A reckless injury
may mean "careless, inattentive, negligent, or desperately heedless." 1 1
In Higbee Co. v. Jackson,1 2 the court even went so far as to say,
"this auto truck was placed in the hands of the driver, making him
conclusively the company's agent, not only in the use, but also in the
abuse, of the right to public safety on the part of the travelling public, either on or off the truck."

'Dover v. Mayes Mfg. Co., 157 N. C. 324, 72 S. E. 1067 (1911); Christie
v. Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S. E. 715 (1923).
Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920); Hughes v. Murdoch Co., 269 Pa. 222, 112 Atl. 111 (1920).
Nelson v. Traction Co., 276 Pa. 178, 119 Atl. 918 (1923).
'Fry v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922)
(Driver knew of perilous position of boy and recklessly exposed him to
danger).
'Kalmich v. White, 95 Conn. 568, 111 AtI. 845 (1920); Aiken v. Holyoke
St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (1903).
'Purple v. U. P. Ry. Co., 114 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
"' Smith Bros. v. Williams, 294 S.W. 309 (Texarkana Civ. App. 1927).
But suppose driver deviates from employment? Depends on degree of deviation. Healey v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S.W. 229 (1918) ; Drakenburg
v. Knight, 178 Wis. 386, 190 N. W. 119 (1922); Cummings v. Truck Co., 241
Mass. 292, 135 N. E. 134 (1922).
'Short v. Kaltman, 192 N. C. 154, 134 S. E. 425 (1926); Heidenreich v.
Bremner, 260 II. 439, 103 N. E. 275 (1913).
"101 Ohio St. 75, 128 N. E. 61 (1920). Accord: La Rose v. Shaughnessy
Ice Co., 197 App. Div. 821, 189 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1921) ; Murphy v. Ross, 2 Ir.
R. 199 (1920); Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124 (1920).
Contra: Goldberg v. Borden's Co., 227 N. Y. 465, 125 N. E. 807 (1920);
Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559, 85 N. W. 1075 (1901).
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Such an unauthorized invitee has been considered as a fellow
servant of the driver and recovery barred, where the invitee gratuitously assisted in unloading the truck.' 3 But upon very similar facts
the same court one year later decided that the relation had been
terminated and permitted a recovery.14
Most of these cases which granted a recovery were concerned
with infant plaintiffs whose ignorance of danger and actual peril are
facts known to the driver, whose knowledge may be imputed to the
master.' 5 Indeed, these representatives of the minority view 1 have
been criticised as questionably combining the doctrine of "dangerous
machinery"' 7 with that of "attractive nuisance," where neither
existed.' 8
Recently there has been a tendency on the part of the legislatures
to break away from the rigid limitation of the rules of liability of
the owner of an automobile. Thus, in some states, this tendency has
been embodied in statutes providing that every owner of an automobile operated upon the public highway shall be liable for injuries
resulting from negligence in operation of such motor vehicle in the
business of the owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating it with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.10
Two states have modified this liability to the effect that the owner is
not necessarily liable for damages beyond the value of the car, when
any other person is operating it, although such damages constitute a
lien upon the car.20
In the instant case it is suggested that in the light of the decisions
and in consideration of the age of the plaintiff (eleven years) that the
court might have been justified in arriving at a different conclusion.

C. E.

REITZEL.

Gunderson v. Eastern Brewing Co., 71 Misc. 519, 130 N. Y. Supp. 785

(1911).
' Nudelman v. Borden's Co., 77 Misc. 103, 136 N. Y. Supp. 49 (1912).
"MMorris v. Peyton, 149 Va. 318, 139 S. E. 500 (1927).
"0Note (1920) 14 A. L. R. 145.

" Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 224.
6 N. C. L. REv. 338.
"lMich. Pub. Acts (1909) No. 318. (Amended so owner not liable when car
driven without his knowledge or consent. Mich. Comp. Laws [Cahill, 1915]
§4825.) Acts 38th Gen. Assem. of Iowa, ch. 275, §12. Conn. Gen. Stat, (1918)
§1572, (bailor liable for injury resulting from negligence of bailee). Repealed-Conn. Pub. Acts (1921) ch. 334. Cal. Gen. Laws (1919) p. 223, §14
(person signing for minor's license to drive is liable for mTnor's negligence),
Laws of N. Y. (1928) ch. 508, p. 1092. (Amended to exclude lessors of automobiles who carry public liability insurance.)
8 (1928)

S. C. Gen. Laws (1915)
(1905) ch. 173, §5.

(27 St. at Large, p. 737) §1. Tenn. Gen. Laws
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Master and Servant-Presumption as to Scope
of Employment
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in the recent case of
Jeffrey v. Osage Manufacturing Co.1 has decided that upon proof
of defendant's ownership of the car that caused the plaintiff's injury
and that the negligent driver thereof was in the general employ of
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to the "permissive" presumption2
that said driver was acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the accident and has therefor established a prima facie
case to be presented to the jury.
The decision is in accord with the majority elsewhere 3 The
reason for this rule is quite evident: that whether the car was at the
time of the injury being used in furtherance of the master's business
and according to his instructions involves matter peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge and upon which it is generally difficult
for the plaintiff to obtain proof. 4 "The prima facie inference that
may be drawn from ownership is analogous to the prima facie inference of negligence that may be drawn from the happening of an
accident of a certain class, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies.5
Variations of the above rule are met in a number of jurisdictions. Pennsylvania, while approving the doctrine in cases of cars
used for business purposes, 6 and during business hours,7 disaffirms it
where the car is a family or pleasure vehicle.8 Massachusetts, 9 while
197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
'See McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927)
5 N. C. L. REv. 291.
'D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; Orlando v. Pioneer
Barber Towel Supply Co., 239 N. Y. 342, 146 N. E. 621 (1925); Yellow Cab
Co. v. Nelson, 35 Ga. App. 694, 134 S.E. 822 (1926) ; Crowell v. Duncan, 145
Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576 (1926) ; Fame Laundry Co. v. Henry, 195 Ind. 456, 144
N. E. 545 (1924) ; Wagnitz v. Scharetz, 265 Pac. 318 (Cal. App. 1928) ; Note

L. R. A. 1918D 924.
'Long v. Nute, 123 Mo. App. 204, 100 S.W. 511 (1907) ; Bogorad v. Dix,
176 N. Y. App. Div. 774, 162 N. Y. Supp. 992 (1917).

'Robb, J., in Curry v. Stevenson, 26 F. (2d) 534, 536 (Ct. of App. D. C.
1928).
'Seiber v. Russ Bros. Ice Cream Co., 276 Pa. 340, 120 At. 272 (1923);
Lauhach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 Atl. 88 (1925).
'Williams v. Ludwig Floral Co., 252 Pa. 140, 97 Atl. 206 (1924).
" Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. St. 339, 66 Atl. 525, 10 Ann. Cas. 731, 10 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 202 (1907).
' Subsequent to the writing of this case comment Massachusetts, in the case
of Thomas v. The Meyer Stores, Inc.. Mass. Adv. Sh. (1929) 2023, has applied its recent statute, Mass. St. 1928, c. 317, which provides that: In all
actions to recover damages for injuries to the person or the property, or for
the death of a person arising out of an accident or collision in which a motor
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generally refusing to follow this rule,10 did so where the master's tools-were in the truck. 1 A leading Ohio case' 2 holds that the presumption does not arise unless it is shown that one of the duties of the
driver is the operation of the car. A different rule is often invoked.
where the car is operated by a member of the defendant's family,1"
although proof of defendant's ownership of car and its operation
by his wife has been held to raise the presumption that the wife
was driving as the husband's agent.' 4 A number of jurisdictions allow
the prima facie inference to be raised from mere proof of ownership
of the automobile.' 5
Those courts which refuse the plaintiff the benefit of the presumption assign as a reason that the jury might thereby find for the
plaintiff on mere speculation and conjecture.' 0 Inasmuch as the
presumption is rebuttable and opportunity is afforded the defendant
for the introduction of evidence tending to disprove the plaintiff's
allegations concerning the driver's scope of authority, a refusal to
invoke the rule would give rise to the greater possibility of non-suit
of a plaintiff with a good cause of action because of his inability to
procure evidence accessible only to the defendant.' 7
YOUNG M. SMITH.
vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of such accident or collision it
was registered in the name of the defendant as owner shall be primna fade
evidence that it was being operated by and under the control of a person for
whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, and absence of such responsibility shall be an affirmative defence to 'be set up in the answer and
proved by the defendant."
"Porcino v. DeStefano, 243 Mass. 398, 137 N. E. 664 (1923).
'"Brien v. Dedham Water Co., 241 Mass. 217, 135 N. E. 130 (1922).
'White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio St. 18, 102 N. E. 302, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1091, Ann. Cas. 1914C 1082 (1914).
'Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1,200 S.W. 286, L. R. A. 1918C 715, Ann. Cas.
1918E.
1127 (1917).
1
"Willet v. Heyer, 140 Atl. 411 (Ct. App. N. J. 1928); Clark v. Sweaney,
175 N. C. 280, 95 S. E. 568 (1918). The presumption of liability clearly exists
in those states invoking the "family purpose doctrine.' Landry v. Overseen,
187 Iowa 284, 174 N. W. 255 (1919); King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 20
S.W.
296, L.R. A. 1918F 293 (1918).
"5Lilly v. Duckworth, 140 Atl. 397 (Ct. App. N. J. 1928) ; Ercole v.Daniel,
105 W. Va. 118, 141 S. E. 631 (1928). See Clark v. Sweaney, sura note 12.
Note L. R. A. 1918D 924.
" Porcino v. DeStefano, supra note 8; Ronan v. J.G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt.
280, 131 Atl. 788 (1926); Welch v. Checker Taxi Co., 159 N. E. 622 (Mass.

1928).

1"The weight, effect, and significance to be given the presumption are of
course dependent upon local laws, practices, and rules of evidence. See Heckel
and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rxv.
724; (1930) 10 BOSTON U. L. Rv. 83.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Money Had and Received-Recovery by Hospital of
Damages Paid for Medical Expense
In two recent North Carolina and South Carolina cases, inter-esting divergence of opinion is apparent as to the scope of the action
of money had and received. In the North Carolina case,' plaintiff
hospital, in a suit against an infant for treatment of his injuries re.ceived in an accident, was allowed recovery not only in quantum
mruit for necessaries, but for money had and received from a judgment against the original wrongdoer which included the hospital
expense as an item of damage. The South Carolina court2 held, on
the other hand, that where an injured man had recovered damages
from his tort-feasor in a suit in which he alleged hospital expenses
as a material factor of his injury, the money so recovered was not
impressed with a trust in favor of his physician.
Although the result reached by the North Carolina court is sound,
it is submitted that this should have been based solely upon the infant's liability for necessaries supplied him, 3 and that the South Carolina court correctly held that there was no trust set up in favor of
the physician. The doctrine of money had and received has been so
loosely applied that it is difficult to determine just when the action
will lie.4 Generally, however, it would seem that the action should
be allowed only where the plaintiff can show that money, rightfully
his, has been paid to the defendant either expressly for the use of
the plaintiff, or where it can be shown that the defendant has obtained the plaintiff's money through mistake of fact, fraud, or duress. 5
'Cole v. Wagner, 197 N. C. 692, 150 S. E. 339 (1929).

'Traywick v. Wannamaker, 150 S. E. 655 (S. C. 1929).
Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. 106 (1851); McAlpine v. Dzwonkiewicz,
231 Mich. 165, 203 N. W. 671 (1925) (the facts of this case square exactly
with the North Carolina case under discussion. The court allowed a full recovery on the liability of the infant's estate for necessaries) ; Harris v.
Crawley, 161 Mich. 383, 126 N. W. 421 (1910) ; O'Donnelly v. Kinley, 220 Mo.
App. 284, 286 S. W. 140 (1926) ; Gibbs v. Poplar Bluff Light and Power Company, 142 Mo. App. 19, 125 S. W. 840 (1910); Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 659.
Contra: Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397, 19 Am. Rep. 371 (1873); Wailing v.
Toll, 9 Johns 141 (N. Y. 1812).
" Holt v. Markham, 92 L. J. K. B. 406, [1923] 1 K. B. 504. (In his opinion
in this case Scrutton, L. J. says: "The whole history of this particular form
of action (money had and received) has been what I may call a history of
well meaning sloppiness of thought"); Hanbury, The Recovery of Money
(1924) 40 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 31.
'Christie v. Durden, 205 Ala. 571, 88 So. 667 (1921) ; Dimmitt v. Johnson,
199 Iowa 966, 203 N. W. 261 (1925) ; Gloyd v. Hotel La Salle, 221 Ill. App.
104 (1921) ; Ambrose v. Graziani, 197 Ky. 679, 247 S. W. 953 (1923) ; Cutler
v. Rand, 8 Cush. 89 (Mass. 1883) ; Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 98 Atl. 929
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But the North Carolina case seems to be the first suggestion that an
action for money had and received might be allowed when all plaintiff could show was a debt due him by the defendant and the receipt
of money by the defendant from a third person that might have been
used to discharge that debt. Obviously there was no question of
mistake, fraud, or duress involved.
As to the remaining question, whether the money was paid to the
defendant for the plaintiff, it seems clear that such was not the case
despite the argument that since the present defendant as plaintiff in
the prior case alleged hospital expense as an element of damage, he
rceived that part of the damages for the plaintiff. The injured person in setting up hospital expenses in his suit against the tort-feasor
did so merely for the purpose of enabling the jury to use this element, along with others such as suffering and impairment of earning
capacity, in measuring the total compensation due him for his injuries, 6 and as the South Carolina court correctly held, not as an
attempt to set himself up as trustee of a fund to the use of the hospital or physician. Nor did the tort-feasor have any interest or
motive to require that any part of the money paid on the judgment
be devoted to the payment of the hospital, for he was not liable to
the hospital.
It would seem, therefore, that the effect of this part of the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is to extend unnecessarily the application of the over-stretched doctrine 7 of money had
and received.
A. W.

LANGSTON.

(1916) ; Reddingius v. Enkema, 156 Minn. 283. 194 N. W. 646 (1923) ; Smith
v. Hicks, 1 Wend. 202 (N. Y. 1829) ; Gochenauer v. Gard, 3 Penr. & W. 274
(Pa. 1831); City of Norfolk v. Norfolk County, 129 Va. 356, 91 S. E. 82a
(1917); Sinclair v. Brougham, 1914 A. C. 398; Banque Beige v. Hambrouck
(1921) 1 K. B. 321; Skelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54, 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (Ex.
1841) ; Marriott v. Hampton, 7 T. R. 269, 101 Eng. Rep. 969 (K. B. D. 1797);
CHrrrY's PLEADING (16th American Edition) at page 365.
6
Ledford v. The Valley River Lumber Company, 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. .

421 (1922);

SEDGWIcx, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES

(2nd. ed. 1909) at pages 11

and 158.
'Rabinowitz v. People's National Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N. E. 289 (1920)
(holding that the right to recover in an action for money had and received
depends upon the obligation to restore that which the law implies should be
returned where one has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another).
Where money is received to a debtors' own use not even a prior assignee can
recover it in an action for money had and received.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Mortgages-Foreclosure Sale.-Requirements for Advance
Bids Under Statute
On the tenth day after a trustee's sale of land under foreclosure
of a deed of trust,1 the plaintiff telephoned the clerk's office, twelve
miles distant, making an advance bid and offering to deliver the
requisite deposit immediately. The clerk, as an accommodation to
the plaintiff, authorized the mailing of a cashier's check on that day.
The check was mailed during the afternoon, and arrived in the hands
of the clerk next morning. After the plaintiff's conversation with
the clerk, and on the tenth day, the plaintiff's attorney called at the
clerk's office and offered to give him his own check, but was told that
the bid had already been raised by his principal. Held, sufficient
compliance with the statute2 prescribing advance bids and deposits
securing the bids to be paid to the clerk within ten days after the sale.
There are three recognized doctrines on the effect of advance
bids as a ground for refusal to confirm judicial sales. 3 The English
view, and that representing the weight of authority in the United
States, is that an advance bid is not in itself sufficient ;4 confirmation
by the court generally being required in the absence of gross inadequacy of price,5 mistake, 6 fraud or other misconduct. 7 The intermediate view holds that confirmation or resale is within the discretion of the court.8 The minority group, followed by North Carolina, holds that confirmation will be refused on receipt of a higher
'Clayton Banking Co. v. Green, 197 N. C. 534, 149 S. E. 689 (1929).
'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2591: At any time within ten days after
an executor's, administrator's, or trustee's sale the sale may be reopened by an
advance bid of 10% where the previous bid was $500.00 or less than 5% where
it was greater, and the "same is paid to the clerk." The clerk shall then issue
an order for resale on fifteen days notice.
'Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
"Grattam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. ed. 839 (1885);
Page v. Kress, 80 Mich. 85, 20 Am. St. Rep. 504, 44 N. W. 1052 (1890) ; Williamson v. Dale, 3 John. Ch. 290 (N. Y. 1819); Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
'To set aside the sale, the bid must be so grossly inadequate as to "shock
the conscience of the court," Rospigliosi v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co., 237
Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916).
'7Mistake, even by the strict majority rule, is held to be a valid ground for
setting aside the sale and ordering resale. In the instant case, granting that
the plaintiff failed tb make his bid within the requirements of the statute, could
not his case be supported on the ground of the clerk's mistake in misrepresenting to him the permissible means of payment?
'Shipe v. Consumer's Service Co., 29 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
'State Bank v. Green, 11 Neb. 303, 9 N. W. 36 (1881) ; State Bank v. Murray, 84 Kan. 524, 114 Pac. 847 (1911) ; Aurbach v. Wolf, 22 App. D. C. 538
(1903) ; Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
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bid ;9 ahd consequently, that inadequacy of price is sufficient ground
for setting aside the sale, an advance bid being regarded as evidence
of the inadequacy of the former one.' 0
With a view to giving every possible advantage to the mortgagor,
substantial compliance with statutes and terms regulating judicial
The statute construed in the principal
sales is well recognized."
case was intended for the protection of the mortgagor where sales
12
are made under power without a decree of foreclosure by the court.
This and similar statutes' s covering other phases of judicial sales
have always been construed liberally by our courts. An oral objection to a partition sale where a written objection was required to be
filed was held to be sufficient compliance ;14 as was an advance bid in
a partition sale made after expiration of the period set out by statute,
but before confirmation of the sale;15 payment of a mistaken amount
demanded by the sheriff was valid redemption from a tax sale;16 on
an advance bid a deposit of two per cent where five was required by
statute was held to be sufficient compliance;I7 the clerk may make
order for delivery of deed after confirmation nu:c pro tunc as of the
' N. C., Pa., W. Va., and in early cases Va. incline to this view. Note
(1921) 11 A. L. R. 399; In re Bost, 56 N. C. 482 (1851); Childress v. Hurt, 2
Swan 487 (Tenn. 1852); Todd v. Gallego Mfg. Co., 84 Va. 586, 5 S. E. 676
(1888) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167 (1885) ; Hamilton's Estate, 51 Pa.
58 (1865).
Perry v. Perry, 179 N. C. 445, 102 S. E. 772 (1920).
'In re Baugess, 196 N. C. 278, 145 S. E. 395 (1928) ; Lawrence v. Beck,
185 N. C. 196, 116 S. E. 424 (1923); Wise v. Short, 181 N. C. 320, 107 S. E.
134 (1921) ; Pringle v. Loan Ass'n, 182 N. C. 316, 108 S. E. 914 (1921) ; McCormick v. Patterson, 194 N. C 216, 139 S. E. 225 (1927) ; as well, terms of
sale under power as set forth in the instrument must be strictly complied with
by the trustee-vendor, Eubanks v. Becton, 158 N. C. 231, 73 S. E. 1009 (1912) ;
Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N. C. 199, 83 S. E. 17 (1914) ; Hogan v. Utter, 175 N.
C. 332, 95 S. E. 565 (1918); Ricks v. Brook, 179 N. C. 204, 102 S. E. 207
(1920) ; see 2 WrLTsiz, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) §833.

'In sales under decree there was always an equity to decree a resale when
a substantial raise in bid had been deposited in court. There being no such
protection as to mortgages with power of sale, this statute was passed to extend to mortagors whose property had been foreclosed under power of sale
without decree of foreclosure, the same opportunity of a resale where there has
been an increased bid, Pringle v. Loan Ass'n., supra note 11.
'Partition, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3230; Partition Sales, N. C.
Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3243; Tax Sales, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919)
§8038.
"McCormick v. Patterson, supra note 11.
'Upchurch v. Upchurch, 173 N. C. 88, 91 S. E. 702 (1917).
" Beck v. Meroney, 135 N. C. 532, 47 S. E. 613 (1904).
'Briggs v. Asheville Developers, 191 N. C. 784, 133 S. E. 3 (1926). But
payment of deposit to trustee instead of clerk held an invalid bid. Newby v.
Gallop, 193 N. C. 244, 136 S. E. 610 (1927).
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original date of sale;18 where the trustee gave a deed prematurely
the title derived was held valid since no injury was caused any interested party.1 9
In the instant case the clerk's exercise of discretion involves what
constitutes actual payment to him, not the time of payment. No
discretion exists to extend the time of payment laid down by the
statute. Neither should the rule laid down in the principal case be
extended to allow the clerk's authorization of mailing from an unreasonable distance, nor to allow his appointment of any unreasonable agency for delivery. Recognition must be given the strong
argument against the North Carolina policy of allowing advance
bids in that it tends to make judicial sales unstable, and chills the
bidding. 20 Granting that a liberal interpretation is consonant with
the purpose of the statute itself, in its effort to protect the mortgagor
by such liberality of construction the court should tak6 proper care
that it does not lean backward and thereby defeat its own purpose.

J. G. ADAmS, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Evidence--Parol Agreements to
Vary Liability of an Indorser
In Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc.,' the payee of five
sealed notes brought action on them six years after maturity. The
defendants who were accommodation indorsers fdr the maker (now
insolvent) pleaded the three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff
offered oral evidence that defendants, directors of the corporation,
prior to their indorsement, agreed to "remain liable and responsible
until the notes were paid." Evidence excluded. Affirmed. Held:
that prior oral agreements which change the status of an indorser to
that of a surety are unenforceable. The court assumes that such an
agreement if held valid would impose the liability of co-makers or
sureties on the indorsers who could then plead only the ten year
statute of limitations for sealed notes.2
Lawrence
Beck,were
supra
note 11.
No advancev. bids
offered
during the statutory period, Wise v. Short,
supra note 11; but the clerk has no power to order a resale until an advance bid

has been made, where the clerk prematurely made order for deed to bidder the
order may be revoked and a resale ordered, Hanna v. Carolina Mortgage Co.,
197 N. C. 184, 148 S. E. 31 (1929).

"Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570, 77 S. E. 458 (1913).
198 N. C. 89, 150 S. E. 676 (2) (1929).

'This point was not raised by either of counsel's briefs or by the court.

The plaintiff counsel sought to have the parol agreement enforced and thereby
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There may be room for doubt as to such assumption, but apart
from that question the case invites a discussion of the extremely important as well as interesting query: When will an extrinsic agreement between an indorser and another immediate party, which provides for a modification of the indorser's prima, facie liability be enforced in North Carolina? This problem can best be understood by
classifying the relevant North Carolina cases as follows: 1-Those
which held such agreements valid prior to the N. I. L. 2-Those
which held such agreements valid since the N. I. L. 3-Those which
held such agreements invalid since the N. I. L. As a forerunner to
this discussion it seems necessary to repeat the well-known rule that
extrinsic negotiations between the immediate parties, which modify
the indorser's liability are never enforced against a bona fide holder
in due course.3
1. Prior to the N. I. L. parol agreements were generally enforced in this state.4 It was then held that a person writing his
name on the back of the instrument before delivery to the payee was
presumed to be a co-maker, guarantor, or surety;5 but if his name
appeared after the payee's indorsement, the presumed liability was
that of an indorser. 6 In Mendenhall v. Davis7 the court enforced
the contemporaneous oral agreement that the blank indorsement was
to have no other effect than to assign the note to the payee. Other
contracts were held valid where the indorsee promised to strike out
the indorsement if the indorser deeded him a certain piece of land,8
and where the understanding was that the payee's indorsement was
to be a receipt to the indorsee as agent for the maker.9
bind the defendants on the extended notes, but the court very properly pointed
out that even if the agreement was valid there was no definite extension of
time.
'Hill v. Shields, 81 N. C. 250 (1879); (1915) 29 HAv. L. REV. 549; 1
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1919) §707; N. I. L. §57.
"Lilly v. Baker, 88 N. C. 151 (1883) ; Love v. Wall, 8 N. C. 313 (1821);
Barden v. Hornthal, 151 N. C. 8, 65 S. E. 513 (1909) (where the notes sued
on were given about a month prior to the adoption of the N. I. L.; (1910)
23 HARV. L. REV. 396.

Barden v. Hornthal, supra note 4; cf. Gomez v. Lazarus, 16 N. C. 205
(1828).
6
Lilly v. Baker, supra note 4.
172 N. C. 150 (1875) (where the court said the indorsement constituted

no contract at all without the collateral oral agreement; see criticism of the
same in II WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §643 "such decisions nullify the
statute") ; cf. Comm's. v. Wasson, 82 N. C. 309 (1880).
'Smitherman v. Smith, 20 N. C. 86 (1838).
'Davis v. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570 (1870).
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2. Since the adoption of the N. I. L. by North Carolina, 10 one
writing his name on the back of an instrument before delivery to the
payee, is no longer presumed to be a co-maker or surety, for sections
63 and 64 provide that such a person is "deemed an indorser" and
is liable as such to the payee and all subsequent parties. Section 68
provides that successive indorsers shall be liable in the order of their
indorsements, but as among themselves, agreements to the contrary
will be enforced. Notwithstanding the express provisions of sections 63 and 64 our court continued to enforce extrinsic agreements
which varied the ordinary liability of an anomalous indorser to the
payee. 1 In Sykes v. Everett'2 the court enforced the oral agreement that the payee was to exhaust the resources of a certain estate
before proceeding against the defendant who had indorsed in blank.
The cases cited as authority were nearly all decided prior to the
adoption of the N. I. L. which was not cited. Likewise, in Fertilizer
Co. v. Eason'3 the court held valid the collateral agreement, entered
into at the time of the blank indorsement, that defendant would remain liable three or four years from the date of the indorsement,
which was a month after maturity of the note. The N. I. L. was not
cited. Both of these cases reviewed the early authorities, and repeated several times that "as between the immediate parties evidence
of parol agreements would be admissible, though it would not be
admissible against bona fide holders." The parol contract was held
valid in Lancaster v. Stanfield14 where defendant's name appeared
fifth in a list of twelve anomalous indorsers who had agreed to be
mutually liable as co-sureties. This case was correctly decided under
section 68 of the N. I. L., referred to above. It has been held in a
comparatively recent case' 5 that a parol contract between a surety
and an indorser that they would be equally liable was enforceable.
3. In other recent cases it was decided that parol agreements
imposing primary liability on an indorser are unenforceable. This
" N. C. Code Ann.
1927) ch. 58, §§2976-3171.
"XCf. McRae v. Fox,(Michie
185 N. C. 343,
117 S. E. 396 (1923), which proceeded
on the ground of mutual mistake but seems insupportable on that ground. The
case is criticised in (1923) 2 N. C. L. REV. 122, the writer of which said that
North Carolina had lined up with the minority in enforcing parol agreements
as between the immediate parties; Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 764; (1921) 11
A. L. R. 637; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 1222.

167 N. C. 600, 83 S. E. 585 (1914).

"194 N. C. 244, 139 S. E. 376 (1927).
"191 N. C. 340, 132 S. E. 21 (1926).
*Gilliam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925).
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rule was first definitely established in Meyers Co. v. Battlel8 which
held that notice of dishonor was necessa Ty notwithstanding a collateral agreement that the indorser would assume the liability of an
"original promisor." A much later case Busbee v. Creech"7 was to
the same effect. By the language tenor of Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton
Mills it seems that our rule has been extended; namely, so that no
collateral agreement which imposes primary liability on the indorser
will be enforced, whether its tendency is to dispense with the necessity
for the notice of dishonor or to repel the effect of the statute of
limitations. The court's careful consideration of the terms of the
N. I. L. in each of the later cases and the absence of that consideration in the earlier cases indicates the possibility that when the
proper occasion arises, the court may overrule Sykes v. Everett and
declare those parol agreements which limit the indorser's liability
also unenforceable.

J. B. LEwis.
Taxation-The Property Basis of Inheritance Taxation of
Intangibles-Inheritance Tax on Shares of NonResident at Corporate Domicile
The United States Supreme Court has recently decided in the
case of Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,1 that the State
of Minnesota cannot levy an inheritance tax upon the transfer of
bonds issued by that State and by its municipal corporations, owned
and held by a non-resident decedent. Such a radical departure from
the opposite rule as laid down in Blackstone v. Miller,2 affecting as
it does enormous interests, is of itself a landmark in the law of taxation. Its greater interest, however lies in the indication of a trend
in tax principles designed to relieve of the burdens of double taxation, and offering an avenue for a rationalization of the fundamental
conceptions of tax jurisdiction.
- 170 N. C. 168, 86 S. E. 1034 (1915) ; cf. Bank v. Wilson, 168 N. C. 557,
84 S. E. 866 (1915) where the same point was raised but expressly left unsettled.
192 N. C. 499, 135 S. E. 326 (1926) criticised in BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTEs
CHECKS (Lile 3 ed. 1928) §426, n. 7, as follows: "neither the reasoning
nor the result will likely be followed elsewhere." The learned author misinterpreted the facts to mean that the defendant indorsers were accommodating
the plaintiff. See also 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§2443-2445; (1924) 38
Hiv. L. REV. 391; BRANNAN, NEGOTiALE INSTRUMENTs LAW (4th ed. 1926)
IT

AND

§§63-64.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). See Note (1930) 43 H{Av. L. REv.
792; (1930) 64 U. S. L. REy. 158.
2188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1902).
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That an inheritance tax is a tax upon the transfer, whether upon
the right to receive or the right to transmit, and not upon the property
itself is well settled.3 But what states have such jurisdiction as will
support the tax has long been in controversy.
Bases of jurisdiction to tax, both property and inheritance, have
heretofore been predicated upon one or more of three factors: (1)
Situs: physical situs of tangibles, 4 and situs of intangibles by reason
of jurisdiction over the owner;8 (2) a user of the laws of a state
necessary to effect the transfer; 6 (3) the protection given to the
debtor and his property at his foreign domicile, which gives the chose
in action its value. 7 The instant case supported by the decisions in
Frick v. Pennsylvania8 and Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Doughton9 inevitably necessitates the conclusion that neither of the
'"Thus the tax is not upon the property in the ordinary sense of the word
but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not until it has yielded its contribution to the state that it becomes the property of the legatee." United States v.
Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073, 41 L. ed. 287 (1895) ; In re Morris'
Estate, 138 N. C. 259, 50 S. E. 682 (1905); Washington County Hospital
Ass'n. v. Mealey, 121 Md. 74, 88 Atl. 136, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1050, 48 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 373. So a state may tax a bequest of United States bonds exempt from
a property tax. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, 44 L. ed.
988 (1899). A majority of the states consider it a tax upon the right to receive. Danna v. Danna, 226 Mass. 297, 115 N. E. 818 (1917) ; GLEASON & OTIs,
INHERITANCE TAXATI N (4th ed. 1925) 256, but the U. S. Supreme Court has
held it to be on the right to transmit. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S.
345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506, 65 L. ed. 620 (1920), in which case the rate of tax is
based upon the entire value of the estate without reference to the specific
beneficiaries.
'Realty may be taxed only in the state where located. Land Title Co. v.
Tax Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189, 42 A. L. R. 417 (1925) ; In re Swift,
137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1892). Personalty taxed where located. Coe v.
Erol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886) ; Tobey v. Kipp, 214
Mass. 477, 101 N. E. 988 (1913) ; but cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Ky., 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. ed. 150 (1905), as to property tax, and
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L.
R. 316 (1925), as to inheritance tax.
'State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (1872);
Blodgett v. Silverman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L. ed. 749 (1927) (also
holding municipal bonds and other specialties to be intangibles). Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
' Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. ed. 830 (1915);
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168, 99 N. E. 377, L. R. A. 1915D 450;
cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4.
'Blackstone-v. Miller, supra note 2; Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, 109 N. E.
148, L. R. A. 1916A 889; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32
Sup. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed. 96 (1911). This theory denounced in Beale, Jurisdiction
to Tax (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 587; cf. Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts
(1917) 31 HARV. L. REv. 905, 929.
'Supra note 4.
'270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 70 L. ed. 475, 43 A. L. R 1374 (1926), reversing 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924).
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last two of these factors govern, but that the controlling requisite
element is territorial jurisdiction of the property taxed. In the first
of the two cases mentioned it was held that tangible personalty may
be taxed only where it is physically located, although its transmission,
by will or intestacy, is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile,10 while, in the second case, North Carolina was denied the right
to levy an inheritance tax on a non-resident's shares in a foreign
corporation although over two thirds of the property of the corporation was located in the state." In the case of State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds,12 it was decided that a property tax could not be imposed on intangibles owned and held by a non-resident, by the domiciliary state of the debtor, but the Blackstone Case, following this
case by thirty years, permitted an inheritance tax upon such property
upon the conclusion that since this tax was upon the transfer and not
the property, there was a taxing jurisdiction in a state whose laws
must needs be invoked in order for the devisee or distributee to acquire his right to the property, and whose laws gave it the protection
that rendered it valuable. This doctrine, repudiated by a large number of states and avoided by about two thirds of them by reciprocity
agreements, has nevertheless persisted as the supreme law until the
13
decision in the instant case.
So, conceding it as uncontrovertibly settled that the situs of intangibles is at the domicile of the owner,' 4 the case under discussion
decides this: that the jurisdiction necessary to sustain an inheritance
'1 re Coppock, 72 Mont. 431, 234 Pac. 258, 39 A. L. R. 1152 (1925) ;
Chicago Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. ed. 1144
(1898); but cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4; Blackstone v. Miller
supra note 2; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S.113, 163, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. ed. 95
(1895) holding that the laws of decedent's domicile governing descent and distribution of property having foreign situs depend upon their adoption by the
foreign sovereign and not upon any force of their own. Since the domiciliary
state may at will, before the transfer change its laws of distribution, it would
seem that it has the power to alter material rights of the legatees.
"Supra note 9.
2 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (1872).
"Supra note 10.
The maxim mobilia sequntur personam is generally used to express this
fact. But see Note (1930) 78 U. PA. L. Ray. 532, discussing the Safe Deposit
& Trust Case, supra note 5, where the court says, that the above maxim will not
be applied

" . . .

if to do so would result in inescapable and patent injustice.

• .."However it is submitted that in the case of intangibles, the actual strict
application and not its abrogation will afford the desired relief from double
taxation. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone. No cases have been
found which deny a state the right to tax its residents' intangibles. For the
purpose of attachment and garnishment debts have a situs wherever the debtor
or his property may be found.
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tax upon a given transfer of property is identical with that required
for a property tax, and that the former, in the absence of Federal
exemptions, 15 may not be collected where the latter may not.
Two anomalous situations, however, continue to exist, and to
mar the above theory of escape from double taxation: (1) the "business situs" theory, under which intangibles localized by a constant
use as a stock in trade in a foreign locality are deemed to have a
physical situs there for the purpose of taxation, 16 and (2) the tax,
both property and inheritance, on the shares of a domestic corporation owned and held by a non-resident.' 7 Thie "business situs" theory
will not be discussed here.
In Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank,' 8 the question before
the court was whether the State of Illinois could levy a property tax
on shares in a national bank owned and held by residents of that
state, and collect such tax through the corporation at the place where
the bank was situated and nowhere else. The court speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Waite decided in the affirmative, but by the following unfortunately ambiguous dictum:
They (shares of national bank stock) are a species of personal
property which is in one sense, intangible and incorporeal, but the
'A tax may be levied upon the succession to property which the state has
no power to subject to direct tax. United States v. Perkins, supra note 3;
Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, 23 Sup. Ct. 803, 47 L. ed. 1035 (1902)
federal securities, Plummer v. Coler, supra note 3; and constitutional provisions
requiring uniformity and equality of assessment have no application. Campbell
v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 26 Sup. Ct. 182, 50 L. ed. 382 (1905) ; see Keeney
v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105, 56 L. ed. 299 (1911).
"New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. ed. 174
(1899) ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38
Sup. Ct. 40, 62 L. ed. 145, L. R. A. 1918C 124; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION, (4th ed.
1924) §§465, 467.
" Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. ed. 556 (1904) ;
Hawley v. Madden, 232 U. S. 1, 12, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. ed. 477 (1913);
'Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U. S. 285, 293, 30 Sup. Ct. 326, 54 L.
ed. 482 (1909) ; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. ed. 229 (1865) ;
Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559, 44 L. ed.
647 (1899) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 63 L. ed. 1124
(1919); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 81, 82,
supra note 9; Abingdon Bank v. Washington County, 88 Va. 293, 13 S. E. 407
(1891) ; South Nashville St. Ry. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 11 S. W. 348, 2
L. R. A. 853 (1889). The right to levy such tax was denied in N. C. v. Ry.
Comm'rs., 91 N. C. 454 (1884), but under the Laws of 1893, ch. 296, §14 appropriate legislation was enacted and the tax adopted. Willey v. Comm'rs., 111
N. C. 397, 16 S. E. 542 (1892) ; Brown v. Jackson, 179 N. C. 366, 369, 102
S. E. 739 (1920).
19 Wall. 490, 503, 22 L. ed. 189, 195 (1873), citing Van Allen v. Assessors,
supra note 17, and construing the National Currency Act of Feb. 25, 1863, 12
Stat. at Large 668.
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law which creates them may separate them from the person of their

owner for the purpose of taxation and give them a situs of their own.
That language cited with approval in a following line of cases, deal-

ing with both a tax directly upon the shares and upon the transfer
thereof by a deceased owner, gave rise to a rule, now firmly imbedded, that a state chartering a corporation could by a provision in

its charter or by general legislative enactment fix the situs of its
shares in that state, and consequently lay both property and inheritance taxes upon such property and its transfer.19 After the decision
in State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds a property tax on choses in
action, except corporate shares, was no longer valid but the right to
levy an inheritance tax under the theory as advanced in the Blackstone Case was not denied. 20
Three arguments have from time to time been offered to sustain
both property and inheritance taxes on the corporate shares of nonresidents, namely: (1) that a state in granting a right which it might
at will withhold, may impose any condition it sees fit upon the exercise of the franchise granted, (2) that a share of stock is more than
an ordinary chose in action and represents an interest in the property
and franchises of the corporation which are located within the state,
(3) the fact that the law of the incorporating state gives value to the
chose in action through its protection of the debtor and his property,
and the offer of access to its courts, as announced in the Blackstone
Case. As to the first, it is settled beyond doubt that a State may
21
annex no unconstitutional conditions to the grant of a franchise.
"It is believed that this tax originated as follows: Few states imposed
inheritance taxes until 1885 when New York passed its law, although Pennsylvania adopted one in 1826. See 26 R. C. L. 165. By this time the dictum of
Mr. Chief Justice Waite on the Tappan case had become a deeply rooted
precedent. In 1891, in Abingdon Bank v. Washington County, supra note 17,
Fauntleroy, J. said, "If a state may do this (tax non-residents' national bank
shares) as to stock and stockholders created by the Congress of the United
States, a fortiori,it may legislate to authorize a county to levy a tax for county
purposes upon the shares of a bank located within the county." It was apparently not considered that the right to tax the national bank shares was
derivative from a sovereign who had nation wide jurisdiction and who could
delegate such right and regulate its exercise as it saw fit. See Note (1903)
58 L. R. A. 513, at 580-581. Also in the Tappan case the tax reviewed was one
levied by a county of the state upon the shares held by all the residetts of the
state, and the question as to non-residents was not in issue. The case could
have been correctly decided upon the proposition that a state had the power to
regulate the collection of taxes levied upon its citizens. The tax in question
was a property tax, and upon such precedent was the present tax nourished.
' Supra note 7.

'See HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AuERIcAx
CoNsTiTUTioNAL LAW (1918) 132 et seq.
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Thus, providing that property which under existing rules is located
clearly without the territorial limits of the sovereign shall have a
taxable situs within the state is patently unconstitutional. Situs is
a fact, determinable at a given time by existing physical circumstances,
and is not subject to removal from place to place at the will of a
legislature. 22 The Rhode Island Hospital Trust Case affirming the
view taken in a long line of prior decisions disposes of the second
-contention, which appears absurd when it is considered that often,
part or all of the property of the domestic corporation is located in a
foreign state. And when a corporation is incorporated in three or
four states it logically follows and has been held that each state has
the right to tax upon the full value of the shares regardless of the
location of its property. 23 The practise is to apportion the amount
of the tax in each state according to the value of the property situated
there; though difficulty in logic occurs when intangibles are to be
apportioned and when tangibles are located in jurisdictions foreign to
the taxing states. This is a matter of comity between the states
24
however, and not of law.
It is submitted that the third argument above has exerted the
greatest influence toward sustaining the tax on corporate shares, to
which it must be confessed, it is even more applicable than the case
of other evidences of indebtedness, and that the first two contentions
are subordinate to it and apparently groundless. Logically then, the
inheritance tax on non-residents' domestic corporate shares would
seem to fall with the tax in the Farmers' Loan and Trust Case.
To so hold, however, will not mean that the incorporating state
can levy no tax on such shares. There still exists a true basis for
taxation, upon which apparently through misconception the inheritance tax was predicated. 25 The "right to be a corporation "as distinguished from the "right to do business" is a franchise granted by
the sovereign to the stockholders 26 upon which an excise tax may
"There is no more reason in holding unconstitutional a provision by the
incorporating state declaring that the situs of bonds, issued by the domestic
corporation and held by a non-resident stockholder, shall be in the state.
"Knowlton v. Moore 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1899);
Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 152 Md. 94, 136 At. 66, 60 A. L.

R. 558 (1927).
"Welch v. Treasurer, 223 Mass. 87, 111 N. E. 774 (1916) ; cf. Kingsbury
v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N. E. 700, 13 Ann. Cas. 738 (1907).
"Supra note 19.
"Fiestam v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293, 13 N. E. 501, 3 Am. St. 492 (1887) ; Memphis
Ry. Co. v. Ry. Commr's., 112 U. S. 609, 5 Sup. Ct. 299, 28 L. ed. 837 (1884) ;
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be levied. 27 For such tax there need be no property within the jurisdiction of the state. There ig no conflict under this type of tax, with
the Rhode Island Hospital Case since there the franchise was "the
right to do business," granted to the corporate entity and not the
stockholders.
It is desirable that the domestic inheritance tax on foreign held
shares be declared invalid. Reciprocity arrangements among the
great majority of the states have reduced the revenue thus derived
to a mere pittance. 28 The only effect this tax seems to have is to
hamper the administration of decedents' estates consisting partly of
corporate stock and to increase the tendency to conceal intangible
29
assets.
HARRY ROCKWELL.

Wills-Construction-Words of Limitation
The residuary clause of a will gave the testator's wife the residue
of the property "to be used by her so long as she lives and enjoys
the same." Held: that the widow gets fee title.1
The absence of words of inheritance is not fatal to the creation,
by will, of an estate in fee,2 although, at common law, a general
devise without words of limitation carried only a life estate.8 As a
general rule, a devise of the residue of an estate is presumed to pass
4 T opso,

Coo0RAToNs, (3d ed. 1927)

§§2919-2920;

but cf.

Bank of Cali-

fornia v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 64 L. R. A. 918 (1904).
'What is meant here is an annual tax upon the franchise, not upon the
theory that the franchise is property within the state, but in the nature of a
license tax upon the privilege of being a corporation within the taxing state.
Such a tax is analogous to one levied upon a non-resident for a license to drive
an automobile upon the highways of the taxing state.
'In 1928, twenty-two states levied inheritance taxes upon intangibles of
non-residents. Florida, Alabama, District of Columbia, and Nevada have no
inheritance tax laws. Eight states allow absolute exemption to such property.
Twelve states belong to reciprocity groups, while Idaho, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Wyoming do not generally exercise their right to tax property of

this type. See report of the Tax Commission of North Carolina (1928)

at

page 521.

' See Report of the Tax Commission of North Carolina (1928) pages 505-6
where instances of delay in administration of estates, causing shrinkage in
values of property are cited.
'Pfeifer v. Wright, 34 F. (2nd) 690 (N. D. Okla. 1929).
'In re Kidd's Estate, 293 Pa. 21, 141 Atl. 644 (1928).
1 TIrFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) 76. But see the interesting case
of Willcut v. Calinan, 98 Mass. 75 (1867) (a devise of a tomb and other real
property was held to be in fee in spite of the absence of words of inheritance,
the court reasoning that the testator did not intend for the devisee to take a
mere life estate in a burial place.
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the fee where no words of limitation are used.4 Thus the words
"give and devise," or either of them, have been held sufficient to
carry the fee. 5 The confusion arises when the testator has added
words which appear to qualify or limit the estate devised, as for example: to W, to hold and enjoy as she thinks best,6 to W, to have full
8
control,7 to W, by her to be fully possessed and enjoyed.
The ambiguity of such words, standing alone, is obvious. The
true intent of the testator can be obtained only by the application of
one or more of the recognized rules for the construction of wills.
Thus, the devise, "to W, to hold for her natural life," was held to
carry the fee where it did not clearly appear by the will that the
testator intended to convey a less estate, 9 while similar words, in
another case,' 0 were construed to pass only a life estate, since other
provisions of the will showed an intent to devise to others subject
to W's life interest. Applying the rule that words repugnant to
what appears to be a devise in fee will not have the effect of reducing the character of the estate, devises, to W, her heirs and assigns,
for her lifetime," to W, in fee simple for life,'2 to W, for her lifetime, to manage and dispose of as she may see cause,' 3 were construed as passing fee title.
In construing the language of a will, an interpretation which will
prevent a partial intestacy is desirable, and, at times, the courts seem
willing to go out of the way in order to attain it. Thus the words,
"as long as life doth last," have been interpreted as tantamount to
"forever,"' 14 and, in the principal case, the clause, "to be used by
her so long as she lives and enjoys the same," was construed to be
simply the expression of a desire on the part of the testator that the
widow might enjoy the estate. The result in the principal case was
obtained with greater ease by reason of the fact that the complainant, an illegitimate daughter, had been substantially remembered in
other articles of the will.
THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
'Carter v. Gray, 58 N. J. Eq. 711. 43 Atl. 711 (1899).

'Burr v. Tierney, 99 Conn. 647. 122 Atl. 454 (1923).
'Johns v. Johns, 86 Va. 333, 10 S. E. 2 (1889) (life estate).

'Melies v. Beatty, 313 Ill. 418, 145 N. E. 146 (1924) (fee).

:Wheaton v. Andress, 23 Wend. 452 (1840)

(life estate).

'Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Stich, 61 Kan. 474, 59 Pac. 1082
(1900).
" Keplinger v. Keplinger, 185 Ind. 81, 113 N. E. 292 (1916).
'Lambe v. Drayton, 182 II1. 110, 55 N. E. 189 (1899).
McAllister v. Tate, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 509, 73 Am. Dec. 119 (1818).
':Alsip v. Morgan, 33 Ky. 72, 109 S. W. 312 (1908).
'l n re Brown, 119 Kan. 402, 239 Pac. 747 (1925), noted (1926) 24 MicH.
L. Rxv. 518.
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Workmen's Compensation-Failure to Observe Traffic
Law as "Willful Misconduct"
The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act provides that, "no
compensation shall be allowed for any injury or death due to the
employee's willful misconduct, including . . . willful failure or refusal to . ..perform a duty required by statute." 1 An employee
was killed in a collision while violating a penal statute regulating the
speed and manner of approaching railway crossings. Held: com2
pensation denied.
It has been held that the breach of a statute is not necessarily, as
a matter of law, serious and willful misconduct.3 The violation of a
city ordinance forbidding walking on elevated railway tracks was
said to be prima facie evidence of negligence. 4 As a general rule,
something more than mere negligence is necessary to constitute the
willfulness -contemplated in the compensation statutes,5 and the act
of the employee must show premeditated and intentional wrong-do7
ing,6 or deliberate action with reckless disregard of the consequences.
No such willfulness was found in cases where the breach of
statutory duty was due to the employee's ignorance of a newly enacted statute,8 where a motor-truck was being operated in violation
of a city ordinance,9 nor where the employer had notice of the deceased's habitual violation of a statutory regulation. 10
However, the general rule seems to be that the violation of a
statute which has been enacted in the interest of the safety of the
workman is willful misconduct."1 Although the majority of the decided cases have involved infractions of statutes governing hazardous
t

Ga. Code 1926, Paragraph 3154 (14).
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 150 S. E. 208. (Ga. 1929), reversing Carroll v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 39 Ga, App. 78, 146 S. E. 788 (1928).
'Rumboll v. Nunnery Colliery Co., 8 D. L. T. 42, C. A. (1899).
'Alexander v. Industrial Board, 281, Ill. 201, 117 N. E. 1040 (1917).
See Berry, The Defense of "Serious and Villful Misconduct" Under the
Workman's Compensation Laws (1914) 78 CENT. L. JouR. 436; Note L. R. A.
1916A 75, 355.

'Wick v. Gunn, 66 Okla. 316, 169 Pac. 1087, 4 A. L. R. 107 (1917).

* Black Mtn. Corp. v. Higgins, 226 Ky. 7, 10 S.W. (2d) 463 (1928).
'King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S.E. 478, 58 A. L. R. 193
(1927), noted (1928) 6 N. C. L. REV. 227. Contra:"Dobson v. United Collieries, 8 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th. Ser. 241, 43 Scot. L. R. 260, 13 Scot. L. T. 644

(1905).

'Bohlen-Huse Coal & Ice Co. v. McDaniel, 148 Tenn. 628, 257 S.W. 848
(1924).
"Union Colliery Co. v. Industrial Comm., 298 Ill.
561, 132 N. E. 200 (1921),
23 A.
L.R. 1150 (1923).
1

"See Notes (1923) 23 A.L.R.1161, (1924) 11 Brit. R. C. 165, 186.
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occupations such as mining,12 blasting,' 3 and the operation of dangerous machinery, 14 the breach of traffic laws has been put in the same
category.' 5 A California case, 16 followed by the principal case, holds
that an employee who, in the course of his employment was killed
as a result of the overturning of an automobile being driven by him
at 2 speed of 35-40 miles per hour when the legal limit was 30, was
guilty of willful misconduct.
Although the conclusion reached in the principal case-that the
violation of a penal statute is of itself willful misconduct-is supported by authority, it is submitted that the result, which leaves the
dependents of an employee, killed in the service of his master, with
no hope of compensation, is contrary to the fundamental theory of
THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
compensation legislation.17
")A few recent cases are: Fortin v. Beam Coal Co., 217 Mich. 508, 187
N. W. 352, 23 A. L. R. 1153 (1922) ; Walcofski v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 228
Pa. 84, 122 Ati. 238 (1923); Stuckoe v. Mickley Coal Co. Ltd., 138 L. T. R.
566 (1928), noted (1928) 166 L. T. 203, (1928) 72 SoL. J. 97 (compensation
allowed.)
" Rudland v. Smith, 50 N. S. 434, 33 D. L. R. 536 (1917); Matthews v.
Pomeroy, 54 L. J. 223, A. C. (1919), Note (1919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 318.
"Bay Shore Laundry Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 36 Cal. App. 547, 172 Pac.

1128 (1918).

"Fidelity etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 171 Cal. 728, 154 Pac. 834, L. R. A.
1916D, 903, noted (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rav. 883, (1918) 4 VA. L. Ra. (n. s.)
at 487.
Other traffic law cases are: Western Pac. etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm.
of Cal., 193 Cal. 413, 224 Pac. 754 (1924) (employee struck by an automobile
while he was riding on unlighted bicycle in violation of law; compensation allowed because of a constitutional provision making employers liable without
regard to the fault of either party.) ; Bohma v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
2 Cal. I. A. C. Dec. 246 (
) (riding a motorcycle along a crowded thoroughfare in a large city is willful misconduct.) ; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pardue,
39 Ga. App. 87, 146 S. E. 638 (1928) (The Georgia court says, "The mere
violation, by an employee, of a criminal traffic law is not ground for denying
compensation in case of injury," but doubtless this decision was reversed by
Aetna etc. Co. v. Carroll, supra note "2); Sun Indemnity Co. v. Ind. Acc.
Comm. of Cal., 76 Cal. App. 165, 243 Pac. 892 (1926) (Truck-driver was
injured when attempting to pass another automobile at 25 miles per hour on
straight road, held, no willful misconduct) ; Wood v. Snyder, 83 Ind. App. 31,
147 N. E. 314 (1925) (Truck-driver guilty of misdemeanor-driving without
license-was not barred from recovery of compensation.) ; cf. Moore v. J. A.
McNulty Co., 171 Minn. 75, 213 N. W. 546 (1927) (Violation of a statute in
attempting to board train held not to defeat recovery of compensation.)
Fidelity etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., supra note 15.
1 For argument against penalizing dependents for misconduct of the employee see, Bohlen, The Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts (1912) 25
HARv. L. Rav. 328, 333. England (W. C. Act, 1925, s. 1 (1) (b)), most of the
Canadian Provinces and a few of the States (Workmen's Compensation of
U. S. and Canada, U. S. Bureau Labor Bull. 423 (1926)) withhold defense of
misconduct when the accident results in permanent disablement or death; California (Stat. Cal. (1929) c. 227, §6 (a) (4)) has adopted this provision since
the Fid. etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. case, suprac note 15 and 16; North Carolina (N. C. CODE (Michie 1929 Supp.) §8081 (6)) reduces compensation 10
percent where injury was result of failure of employee to perform statutory
duty.

